

# Security

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# Alauda Container Security

Alauda Container Security is a comprehensive security solution designed for Kubernetes and containerized environments. It provides centralized management, automated vulnerability scanning, policy enforcement, and compliance checks to help organizations secure their container infrastructure across multiple clusters.

Alauda Container Security adopts a distributed, container-based architecture, consisting of Central Services (for management, API, and UI) and Secured Cluster Services (for monitoring, policy enforcement, and data collection). It integrates with CI/CD pipelines, SIEM, logging systems, and supports the built-in Scanner V4 vulnerability scanner.

## Note

Because Alauda Security Service releases on a different cadence from Alauda Container Platform, the Alauda Security Service documentation is now available as a separate documentation set at [Alauda Security Service](#).

# Alauda Cluster Authentication

The Alauda Container Platform Cluster Authentication plugin provides an independent authentication integration capability for global cluster failure scenarios.

When the `global` cluster fails, users can still log in through this service to access and operate Kubernetes clusters, maintaining permissions consistent with the state before the global cluster failure.

## Note

Because Cluster Authentication releases on a different cadence from Alauda Container Platform, the Cluster Authentication documentation is now available as a separate documentation set at [Cluster Authentication](#).

# Security and Compliance

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# Compliance

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# Introduction

ACP provides compliance functionality based on the open-source Kyverno component, enabling organizations to define and enforce policies across their Kubernetes clusters.

This feature addresses the challenge of maintaining consistent security, governance, and operational standards by allowing users to create custom policies using Kyverno's YAML syntax and automatically validate resources against these policies.

The compliance functionality provides comprehensive violation monitoring and reporting capabilities, offering both resource-level and policy-level views of compliance violations through an intuitive interface, helping teams quickly identify non-compliant resources and take appropriate remediation actions to maintain their desired security posture and regulatory compliance.

## INFO

For more information about Kyverno, read the [Kyverno Documentation](#) ↗.

# Install Alauda Container Platform Compliance with Kyverno

Alauda Container Platform Compliance with Kyverno is a platform service that integrates Kyverno for managing compliance policies on the Alauda Container Platform.

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[Install via console](#)

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1. Check available versions
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## Install via console

1. Navigate to **Administrator**
2. In the left navigation bar, click **Marketplace** > **Cluster Plugins**
3. Search for **Alauda Container Platform Compliance with Kyverno** and click to view its details
4. Click **Install** to deploy the plugin

# Install via YAML

## 1. Check available versions

Ensure the plugin has been published by checking for ModulePlugin and ModuleConfig resources, in `global` cluster :

```
# kubectl get moduleplugins kyverno
NAME      AGE
kyverno   4d20h

# kubectl get moduleconfigs -l cpaas.io/module-name=kyverno
NAME          AGE
kyverno-v4.0.4 4d21h
```

This indicates that the ModulePlugin `kyverno` exists in the cluster and version `v4.0.4` is published.

## 2. Create a ModuleInfo

Create a ModuleInfo resource to install the plugin without any configuration parameters:

```

apiVersion: cluster.alauda.io/v1alpha1
kind: ModuleInfo
metadata:
  annotations:
    cpaas.io/display-name: kyverno
    cpaas.io/module-name: '{"en": "Alauda Container Platform Compliance f
or Kyverno",
  "zh": "Alauda Container Platform Compliance for Kyverno"}'
  labels:
    cpaas.io/cluster-name: global
    cpaas.io/module-name: kyverno
    cpaas.io/module-type: plugin
    cpaas.io/product: Platform-Center
  name: kyverno-global
spec:
  version: v4.2.0

```

#### Field explanations:

- `name`: Temporary name for the cluster plugin. The platform will rename it after creation based on the content, in the format `<cluster-name>-<hash of content>`, e.g., `global-ee98c9991ea1464aaa8054bdacbab313`.
- `label cpaas.io/cluster-name`: Specifies the cluster where the plugin should be installed.
- `label cpaas.io/module-name`: Plugin name, must match the ModulePlugin resource.
- `label cpaas.io/module-type`: Fixed field, must be `plugin`; missing this field causes installation failure.
- `.spec.config`: If the corresponding ModuleConfig is empty, this field can be left empty.
- `.spec.version`: Specifies the plugin version to install, must match `.spec.version` in ModuleConfig.

## Uninstallation Procedures

1. Follow steps 1-3 from the installation process to locate the plugin
2. Click **Uninstall** to remove the plugin



# Upgrade

## INFO

This document provides the upgrade path principles and supported version compatibility for Alauda Container Platform Compliance for Kyverno.

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## Compatibility Matrix

The table below lists supported versions of the Alauda Container Platform Compliance for Kyverno:

Compliance for Kyverno Version	Supported Alauda Container Platform Version
4.3.x	4.2.x, 4.3.x

Compliance for Kyverno Version	Supported Alauda Container Platform Version
4.2.x	4.2.x

## Upgrade Path Guidelines

### Upgrade Alongside ACP

- **Description:** In ACP 4.1.x and earlier releases, Compliance for Kyverno plugins were lifecycle-aligned with ACP and were upgraded as part of the ACP release. For the following upgrade paths, the plugins are upgraded alongside ACP to version 4.3.0 during the ACP upgrade process.
- **Supported ACP Upgrade Paths:**
  - 4.0.x -> 4.3.0
  - 4.1.x -> 4.3.0
- **Result:** After the upgrade is completed, all Compliance for Kyverno plugins are upgraded to version 4.3.0.

### Minor Version Upgrade

- **Description:** Compliance for Kyverno plugins support minor version upgrades when ACP is on a compatible version.
- **Prerequisite:** ACP version must satisfy the compatibility matrix above.
- **Example:** 4.2.x -> 4.3.x

### Patch-Level Upgrade

- **Description:** Upgrades between any patch versions within the same minor version are fully compatible and can be performed directly.
- **Example:** 4.3.0 -> 4.3.x

# HowTo

---

# Private Registry Access Configuration

This guide demonstrates how to configure Kyverno to access private container registries. When Kyverno needs to verify image signatures or check image details, it requires proper credentials to access private registries - just like a key card is needed to enter a secure building.

## TOC

### [Why Does Kyverno Need Registry Access?](#)

#### Quick Start

1. Create Registry Secret
2. Configure Kyverno to Use the Secret (Recommended)
3. Kyverno Deployment Configuration

## Why Does Kyverno Need Registry Access?

Kyverno needs to access registries when it:

- **Verifies image signatures:** Downloads signature data to check if images are properly signed
- **Checks image metadata:** Reads image labels, annotations, and manifest information
- **Scans for vulnerabilities:** Downloads images for security scanning

- **Validates image contents:** Inspects what's actually inside container images

Think of it like a security guard who needs to check ID - Kyverno needs to "see" the images to verify them.

## Quick Start

### 1. Create Registry Secret

```
# For company's private registry
kubectl create secret docker-registry my-registry-secret \
  --docker-server=registry.company.com \
  --docker-username=<username> \
  --docker-password=<password> \
  --docker-email=<email@company.com> \
  -n kyverno
```

### 2. Configure Kyverno to Use the Secret (Recommended)

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
  name: kyverno
  namespace: kyverno
imagePullSecrets:
  - name: my-registry-secret
```

### 3. Kyverno Deployment Configuration

If more control is needed, the Kyverno deployment can be modified directly:

```
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: kyverno
  namespace: kyverno
spec:
  replicas: 1
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: kyverno
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: kyverno
    spec:
      serviceAccountName: kyverno
      imagePullSecrets:
        - name: my-registry-secret
        - name: gcr-secret
        - name: dockerhub-secret
      containers:
        - name: kyverno
          image: ghcr.io/kyverno/kyverno:latest
          env:
            - name: REGISTRY_CREDENTIAL_HELPERS
              value: "ecr-login,gcr,acr-env" # Enable credential helpers
            # ... other configuration
```

# Image Signature Verification Policy

This guide demonstrates how to configure Kyverno to verify that container images are properly signed before they can run in a Kubernetes cluster. Think of it like checking an ID card - only images with valid "signatures" are allowed in.

## TOC

### [What is Image Signature Verification?](#)

#### Quick Start

1. Generate Keys
2. Sign Images
3. Create Basic Verification Policy
4. Test It

#### Common Use Cases

- Scenario 1: Multiple Teams Need to Sign Critical Images
- Scenario 2: Different Rules for Different Environments
- Scenario 3: Using Certificates Instead of Keys

## What is Image Signature Verification?

Image signature verification is like having a security guard check IDs at the door. It ensures:

- **Images are authentic:** They come from who they claim to come from
- **Images are untampered:** No one has modified them after signing
- **Only trusted images run:** Unsigned or improperly signed images are blocked
- **Audit trail:** Track which images were verified and when

## Quick Start

### 1. Generate Keys

```
# Create a signing key pair (like creating an ID card system)
cosign generate-key-pair
# This creates: cosign.key (private, keep secret) and cosign.pub (public,
share freely)
```

### 2. Sign Images

```
# Sign images (like putting an official stamp on it)
cosign sign --key cosign.key registry.company.com/app:v1.0.0
```

### 3. Create Basic Verification Policy

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: require-signed-images
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce # Block unsigned images
  background: false
  rules:
    - name: check-signatures
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      verifyImages:
        - imageReferences:
            - "registry.company.com/*" # Check images from company registry
          attestors:
            - count: 1
              entries:
                - keys:
                    publicKey: |-
                      -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
                      # Paste the cosign.pub content here
                      MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE8nXRh950IZbRj8Ra/N9sb
q0PZrfM
                      5/KAQN0/KjHcorm/J5yctVd7iEcnessRQjU917hmK06JWVGHpDguIyakZ
A==
                      -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
                mutateDigest: true # Convert tags to secure digest format

```

## 4. Test It

```
# Apply the policy
kubect1 apply -f signature-policy.yaml

# Try to run an unsigned image (should fail)
kubect1 run test --image=nginx:latest

# Try to run a signed image (should work)
kubect1 run test --image=registry.company.com/app:v1.0.0
```

## Common Use Cases

### Scenario 1: Multiple Teams Need to Sign Critical Images

For critical applications, both the development team AND security team might need to sign images:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: require-dual-signatures
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: false
  rules:
    - name: critical-app-signatures
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      verifyImages:
        - imageReferences:
            - "registry.company.com/critical/*"
          attestors:
            # Both teams must sign
            - count: 1 # Security team signature
              entries:
                - keys:
                    publicKey: |-
                      -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
                      # Security team's public key
                      MFkwEwYHKOZIZj0CAQYIKoZIZj0DAQcDQgAE8nXRh950IZbRj8Ra/N9sb
qOPZrfM
                      5/KAQN0/KjHcorm/J5yctVd7iEcnessRQjU917hmK06JWVGHpDguIyakZ
A==
                    -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
                - count: 1 # Development team signature
                  entries:
                    - keys:
                        publicKey: |-
                          -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
                          # Development team's public key
                          MFkwEwYHKOZIZj0CAQYIKoZIZj0DAQcDQgAEyctVd7iEcnessRQjU917h
mK06JWV
                          GHpDguIyakZA8nXRh950IZbRj8Ra/N9sbqOPZrfM5/KAQN0/KjHcorm/J
5==
                        -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
          mutateDigest: true

```

## Scenario 2: Different Rules for Different Environments

Production needs strict verification, development can be more relaxed:



```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: environment-specific-verification
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: false
  rules:
    # Strict rules for production
    - name: production-must-be-signed
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              namespaces:
                - production
      verifyImages:
        - imageReferences:
            - "*" # All images must be signed
          failureAction: Enforce # Block if not signed
          attestors:
            - count: 1
              entries:
                - keys:
                    publicKey: |-
                      -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
                      # Production signing key
                      MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE8nXRh950IZbRj8Ra/N9sb
                      q0PZrfM
                      5/KAQN0/KjHcorm/J5yctVd7iEcnessRQjU917hmK06JWVGHpDguIyakZ
                      A==
                      -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
                mutateDigest: true

    # Relaxed rules for development
    - name: development-warn-unsigned
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              namespaces:
```

```

- development
- staging
verifyImages:
- imageReferences:
- "registry.company.com/*" # Only check company images
failureAction: Audit # Audit but allow unsigned images
attestors:
- count: 1
  entries:
  - keys:
    publicKey: |-
      -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
      # Development signing key
      MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEyctVd7iEcnessRQjU917h
mK06JWV
      GHpDguIyakZA8nXRh950IZbRj8Ra/N9sbq0PZrfM5/KAQN0/KjHcorm/J
5==
      -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
mutateDigest: true

```

## Scenario 3: Using Certificates Instead of Keys

For enterprise environments, X.509 certificates might be used:

```

# Sign with certificate
cosign sign --cert company-cert.pem --cert-chain ca-chain.pem \
  registry.company.com/myapp:v1.0.0

```





# Image Signature Verification Policy with Secrets

This guide demonstrates how to use Kubernetes Secrets to store public keys for Kyverno image signature verification, providing better security and key management compared to embedding keys directly in policies.

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### [Why Use Secrets for Public Keys?](#)

#### Quick Start

1. Generate and Store Keys in Secret
2. RBAC Configuration for Kyverno
3. Create Policy Using Secret Reference
4. Test the Configuration

#### Secret Creation Methods

Method 1: From File

Method 2: From Literal String

Method 3: From YAML Manifest

#### Common Use Cases

Scenario 1: Single Team with One Secret

Scenario 2: Multi-Team with Different Secrets

Scenario 3: Critical Images Requiring Multiple Signatures

Scenario 4: Offline Environment with Secrets

# Why Use Secrets for Public Keys?

Using Kubernetes Secrets for storing public keys offers several advantages:

- **Enhanced Security:** Keys are stored securely in the Kubernetes Secret store
- **Easy Key Rotation:** Update keys without modifying policies
- **Access Control:** Use RBAC to control who can access the secrets

## Quick Start

### 1. Generate and Store Keys in Secret

```
# Generate cosign key pair
cosign generate-key-pair

# Create secret from the public key file
kubectl create secret generic cosign-public-key \
  --from-file=cosign.pub=./cosign.pub \
  --namespace=kyverno

# Verify the secret was created
kubectl get secret cosign-public-key -n kyverno
```

### 2. RBAC Configuration for Kyverno

Create Service Account for Kyverno

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
  name: kyverno-secret-reader
  namespace: kyverno
```

## Create Role for Secret Access

```
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  namespace: kyverno
  name: secret-reader
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["secrets"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
  resourceNames: ["cosign-public-key", "team-keys"] # Specific secrets only
```

## Bind Role to Service Account

```
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
  name: read-secrets
  namespace: kyverno
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
  name: kyverno-secret-reader
  namespace: kyverno
roleRef:
  kind: Role
  name: secret-reader
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
```

## 3. Create Policy Using Secret Reference

```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: verify-with-secret
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: false
  rules:
    - name: check-signatures
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds: [Pod]
      verifyImages:
        - imageReferences:
            - "registry.company.com/*"
      attestors:
        - count: 1
          entries:
            - keys:
                secret:
                  name: cosign-public-key
                  namespace: kyverno
                  key: cosign.pub
                rekor:
                  url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev
      mutateDigest: true
```

## 4. Test the Configuration

```
# Sign an image
cosign sign --key cosign.key registry.company.com/app:v1.0.0

# Apply the policy
kubectl apply -f verify-with-secret.yaml

# Test with signed image (should work)
kubectl run test --image=registry.company.com/app:v1.0.0

# Test with unsigned image (should fail)
kubectl run test-fail --image=nginx:latest
```

## Secret Creation Methods

### Method 1: From File

```
# Create secret from existing cosign public key file
kubectl create secret generic cosign-public-key \
  --from-file=cosign.pub=./cosign.pub \
  --namespace=kyverno
```

### Method 2: From Literal String

```
# Create secret with inline public key content
kubectl create secret generic cosign-public-key \
  --from-literal=cosign.pub="-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE8nXRh950IZbRj8Ra/N9sbq0PZrfM
5/KAQN0/KjHcorm/J5yctVd7iEcnessRQjU917hmK06JWVGHpDguIyakZA==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----" \
  --namespace=kyverno
```

### Method 3: From YAML Manifest

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
  name: cosign-public-key
  namespace: kyverno
  labels:
    app: kyverno
    component: image-verification
type: Opaque
stringData:
  cosign.pub: |
    -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
    MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE8nXRh950IZbRj8Ra/N9sbq0PZrfM
    5/KAQN0/KjHcorm/J5yctVd7iEcnessRQjU917hmK06JwVGHpDguIyakZA==
    -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
```

```
kubectl apply -f cosign-secret.yaml
```

## Common Use Cases

### Scenario 1: Single Team with One Secret

Simple setup where one team manages all image signatures:

```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: single-team-verification
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: false
  rules:
    - name: verify-team-signatures
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds: [Pod, Deployment, StatefulSet, DaemonSet]
      exclude:
        any:
          - resources:
              namespaces: [kube-system, kyverno]

  verifyImages:
    - imageReferences:
        - "registry.company.com/*"
        - "gcr.io/myproject/*"


  failureAction: Enforce

  attestors:
    - count: 1
      entries:
        - keys:
            secret:
              name: team-cosign-key
              namespace: kyverno
              key: cosign.pub
            rekor:
              url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev

  mutateDigest: true
  verifyDigest: true
  required: true
```

## Scenario 2: Multi-Team with Different Secrets

Different teams have their own signing keys and secrets:



```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: multi-team-verification
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: false
  rules:
    # Frontend team images
    - name: verify-frontend-images
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds: [Pod]
              namespaces: [frontend-*]

      verifyImages:
        - imageReferences:
            - "registry.company.com/frontend/*"

        attestors:
          - count: 1
            entries:
              - keys:
                  secret:
                    name: frontend-team-key
                    namespace: kyverno
                    key: cosign.pub
                  rekor:
                    url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev

            mutateDigest: true
            required: true


    # Backend team images
    - name: verify-backend-images
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds: [Pod]
              namespaces: [backend-*]

      verifyImages:
```

```
- imageReferences:  
  - "registry.company.com/backend/*"  
  
attestors:  
  - count: 1  
    entries:  
      - keys:  
          secret:  
            name: backend-team-key  
            namespace: kyverno  
            key: cosign.pub  
          rekor:  
            url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev  
  
mutateDigest: true  
required: true
```

## Scenario 3: Critical Images Requiring Multiple Signatures

High-security environments where multiple teams must sign critical images:



```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: critical-multi-signature
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: false
  rules:
    - name: verify-critical-images
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds: [Pod]
              namespaces: [production]

      verifyImages:
        - imageReferences:
            - "registry.company.com/critical/*"

      failureAction: Enforce

      attestors:
        # Security team signature (required)
        - count: 1
          entries:
            - keys:
                secret:
                  name: security-team-key
                  namespace: kyverno
                  key: security.pub
                rekor:
                  url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev


        # Development team signature (required)
        - count: 1
          entries:
            - keys:
                secret:
                  name: dev-team-key
                  namespace: kyverno
                  key: development.pub
                rekor:
                  url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev
```

```
# Release team signature (required)
- count: 1
  entries:
  - keys:
    secret:
      name: release-team-key
      namespace: kyverno
      key: release.pub
    rekor:
      url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev

mutateDigest: true
required: true
```

## Scenario 4: Offline Environment with Secrets

Using secrets in air-gapped environments:





# Image Registry Validation Policy

This guide demonstrates how to configure Kyverno to control which container registries can be used in a Kubernetes cluster. It implements registry access control policies to ensure only images from approved and trusted registries are deployed.

## TOC

### [What is Image Registry Validation?](#)

#### Quick Start

1. Block All Except Company Registry
2. Test It

#### Common Scenarios

- Scenario 1: Allow Multiple Trusted Registries
- Scenario 2: Different Rules for Different Environments
- Scenario 3: Block Specific Risky Registries
- Scenario 4: Team-Specific Registry Access

#### Advanced Patterns

- Using Wildcards Effectively

#### Best Practices

- Start with Warnings
- Exclude System Namespaces
- Common Issues

# What is Image Registry Validation?

Registry validation provides centralized control over image sources. It enables:

- **Control image sources:** Only allow images from trusted registries
- **Block risky registries:** Prevent use of unknown or compromised registries
- **Enforce compliance:** Meet security requirements about image sources
- **Different rules per environment:** Strict rules for production, relaxed for development
- **Track usage:** Monitor which registries are being utilized

## Quick Start

### 1. Block All Except Company Registry

```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: company-registry-only
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce # Block non-approved images
  background: false
  rules:
    - name: check-registry
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: "Only company registry allowed: registry.company.com"
        pattern:
          spec:
            containers:
              - image: "registry.company.com/*"
```

## 2. Test It

```
# Apply the policy
kubectl apply -f registry-policy.yaml

# This should fail (nginx from Docker Hub)
kubectl run test --image=nginx:latest

# This should work (if images exist in the registry)
kubectl run test --image=registry.company.com/nginx:latest
```

## Common Scenarios

### Scenario 1: Allow Multiple Trusted Registries

Organizations typically use several registries:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: multiple-trusted-registries
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: false
  rules:
    - name: check-approved-registries
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
            validate:
              message: "Images must come from approved registries: company registry, GCR, or official Docker images"
              anyPattern:
                - spec:
                    containers:
                      - image: "registry.company.com/*" # Company registry
                - spec:
                    containers:
                      - image: "gcr.io/project-name/*" # Google Container Registry
                - spec:
                    containers:
                      - image: "docker.io/library/*" # Official Docker images only
                - spec:
                    containers:
                      - image: "quay.io/organization/*" # Red Hat Quay

```

## Scenario 2: Different Rules for Different Environments

Production environments should be strict, development can be more flexible:



```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: environment-based-registry-rules
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: false
  rules:
    # Production: Only certified images
    - name: production-strict-registries
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              namespaces:
                - production
                - prod-*
      validate:
        message: "Production only allows certified company images"
        pattern:
          spec:
            containers:
              - image: "registry.company.com/certified/*"

    # Development: More registries allowed
    - name: development-flexible-registries
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              namespaces:
                - development
                - dev-*
                - staging
                - test-*
      validate:
        message: "Development can use company registry, GCR, or official
        Docker images"
        anyPattern:
          - spec:
              containers:
```

```
- image: "registry.company.com/*"
- spec:
  containers:
    - image: "gcr.io/dev-project/*"
- spec:
  containers:
    - image: "docker.io/library/*"
- spec:
  containers:
    - image: "docker.io/organization/*"
```

## Scenario 3: Block Specific Risky Registries

Block specific registries while allowing others:

```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: block-risky-registries
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: false
  rules:
    # Method 1: Use deny list approach
    - name: block-untrusted-registries
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: "Images from untrusted-registry.com are not allowed"
        deny:
          conditions:
            - key: "{{ request.object.spec.containers[?contains(image, 'untrusted-registry.com')] | length(@) }}"
              operator: GreaterThan
              value: 0

    # Method 2: Use allow list for Docker Hub (only official images)
    - name: allow-only-official-dockerhub
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: "Only official Docker Hub images are allowed (docker.io/library/*)"
        deny:
          conditions:
            - key: "{{ request.object.spec.containers[?starts_with(image, 'docker.io/') && !starts_with(image, 'docker.io/library/')] | length(@) }}"
              operator: GreaterThan
              value: 0
```

## Scenario 4: Team-Specific Registry Access

Different teams can have access to different registries:



```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: team-specific-registries
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: false
  rules:
    # Frontend team can use Node.js images
    - name: frontend-team-registries
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              namespaces:
                - frontend-*
      validate:
        message: "Frontend team can use company registry and official Node.js images"
        anyPattern:
          - spec:
              containers:
                - image: "registry.company.com/*"
          - spec:
              containers:
                - image: "docker.io/library/node:*"
          - spec:
              containers:
                - image: "docker.io/library/nginx:*"

    # Data team can use ML/AI registries
    - name: data-team-registries
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              namespaces:
                - data-*
                - ml-*
      validate:
        message: "Data team can use company registry and ML/AI images"
```

```

anyPattern:
- spec:
  containers:
  - image: "registry.company.com/*"
- spec:
  containers:
  - image: "docker.io/tensorflow/*"
- spec:
  containers:
  - image: "docker.io/pytorch/*"
- spec:
  containers:
  - image: "nvcr.io/nvidia/*"

```

## Advanced Patterns

### Using Wildcards Effectively

```

# Match patterns:
- image: "registry.company.com/*"           # Any image from this registry
- image: "registry.company.com/team-a/*"    # Only team-a images
- image: "*/database:*"                    # Any database image from any registry
- image: "gcr.io/project-*/app:*"          # Any app from project-* in GCR

```

## Best Practices

### Start with Warnings

```

spec:
  validationFailureAction: Audit # Start with audit mode, not blocking

```

### Exclude System Namespaces

```
rules:  
  - name: check-registries  
    match:  
      any:  
        - resources:  
            kinds:  
              - Pod  
    exclude:  
      any:  
        - resources:  
            namespaces:  
              - kube-system  
              - kyverno  
              - kube-public
```

## Common Issues

### 1. Wrong image format:

- ✗ `registry.company.com:5000/app` (missing protocol)
- ✓ `registry.company.com/app:latest`

### 2. Wildcard confusion:

- ✗ `registry.company.com*` (missing slash)
- ✓ `registry.company.com/*`

### 3. Docker Hub format:

- ✗ `nginx` (implicit docker.io)
- ✓ `docker.io/library/nginx`

# Container Escape Prevention Policy

This guide demonstrates how to configure Kyverno to prevent container escape attacks by blocking high-risk container configurations that could allow containers to break out of their isolation boundaries.

## TOC

### [What is Container Escape Prevention?](#)

#### Quick Start

1. Block Privileged Containers
2. Test the Policy

#### Core Container Escape Prevention Policies

Policy 1: Disallow Host Namespace Access

Policy 2: Disallow Host Path Mounts

Policy 3: Disallow Host Ports

Policy 4: Disallow Dangerous Capabilities

Policy 5: Require Non-Root Containers

#### Advanced Scenarios

Scenario 1: Environment-Specific Policies

Scenario 2: Workload-Specific Exceptions

#### Testing and Validation

Test Privileged Container

Test Host Namespace Access

Test Host Path Mount

Test Valid Secure Container

Best Practices

1. Start with Audit Mode
  2. Exclude System Namespaces
- 

## What is Container Escape Prevention?

Container escape prevention involves detecting and blocking dangerous container configurations that could allow attackers to escape container isolation and gain access to the host system. This includes:

- **Privileged containers:** Containers running with elevated privileges
- **Host namespace access:** Containers sharing host PID, network, or IPC namespaces
- **Host path mounts:** Containers mounting host filesystem paths
- **Dangerous capabilities:** Containers with excessive Linux capabilities
- **Host port access:** Containers binding to host network ports

## Quick Start

### 1. Block Privileged Containers

---

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: disallow-privileged-containers
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow Privileged Containers
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Privileged mode disables most security mechanisms and must not be a
llowed.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: privileged-containers
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: >-
          Privileged mode is disallowed. The fields spec.containers[*].se
curityContext.privileged,
          spec.initContainers[*].securityContext.privileged, and spec.eph
emeralContainers[*].securityContext.privileged
          must be unset or set to false.
      pattern:
        spec:
          =(ephemeralContainers):
            - =(securityContext):
                =(privileged): "false"
          =(initContainers):
            - =(securityContext):
                =(privileged): "false"
        containers:
          - =(securityContext):
              =(privileged): "false"

```

## 2. Test the Policy

```
# Apply the policy
kubectl apply -f disallow-privileged-containers.yaml

# Try to create a privileged container (should fail)
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-privileged
spec:
  containers:
  - name: nginx
    image: nginx
    securityContext:
      privileged: true
EOF

# Try to create a normal container (should work)
kubectl run test-normal --image=nginx

# Clean up
kubectl delete pod test-privileged test-normal --ignore-not-found
```

## Core Container Escape Prevention Policies

### Policy 1: Disallow Host Namespace Access

Prevent containers from accessing host namespaces:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: disallow-host-namespaces
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow Host Namespaces
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Host namespaces (Process ID namespace, Inter-Process Communication
      namespace, and
      network namespace) allow access to shared information and can be us
      ed to elevate
      privileges. Pods should not be allowed access to host namespaces.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: host-namespaces
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: >-
          Sharing the host namespaces is disallowed. The fields spec.host
          Network,
          spec.hostIPC, and spec.hostPID must be unset or set to false.
        pattern:
          spec:
            =(hostPID): "false"
            =(hostIPC): "false"
            =(hostNetwork): "false"

```

## Policy 2: Disallow Host Path Mounts

Block containers from mounting host filesystem paths:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: disallow-host-path
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow Host Path
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod,Volume
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      HostPath volumes let Pods use host directories and volumes in containers.
      Using host resources can be used to access shared data or escalate privileges
      and should not be allowed.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: host-path
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
            validate:
              message: >-
                HostPath volumes are forbidden. The field spec.volumes[*].hostPath must be unset.
              pattern:
                spec:
                  =(volumes):
                    - X(hostPath): "null"

```

## Policy 3: Disallow Host Ports

Prevent containers from binding to host network ports:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: disallow-host-ports
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow Host Ports
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Access to host ports allows potential snooping of network traffic a
nd should not be
      allowed, or at minimum restricted to a known list.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: host-ports-none
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
            validate:
              message: >-
                Use of host ports is disallowed. The fields spec.containers[*].
ports[*].hostPort,
                spec.initContainers[*].ports[*].hostPort, and spec.ephemeralCon
tainers[*].ports[*].hostPort
                must either be unset or set to 0.
              pattern:
                spec:
                  =(ephemeralContainers):
                    -(ports):
                      -(hostPort): 0
                  =(initContainers):
                    -(ports):
                      -(hostPort): 0
                containers:
                  -(ports):
                    -(hostPort): 0

```

## **Policy 4: Disallow Dangerous Capabilities**

Block containers from adding dangerous Linux capabilities:



```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: disallow-capabilities-strict
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow Capabilities (Strict)
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Restricted)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Adding capabilities other than `NET_BIND_SERVICE` is disallowed. In
addition,
      all containers must explicitly drop `ALL` capabilities.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: require-drop-all
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      preconditions:
        all:
          - key: "{{ request.operation || 'BACKGROUND' }}"
            operator: NotEquals
            value: DELETE
      validate:
        message: >-
          Containers must drop `ALL` capabilities.
        foreach:
          - list: request.object.spec.[ephemeralContainers, initContainers,
containers][]
            deny:
              conditions:
                all:
                  - key: ALL
                    operator: AnyNotIn
                    value: "{{ element.securityContext.capabilities.drop || `
[]` }}"
          - name: adding-capabilities
            match:

```

```

any:
- resources:
  kinds:
  - Pod
preconditions:
  all:
  - key: "{{ request.operation || 'BACKGROUND' }}"
    operator: NotEquals
    value: DELETE
validate:
  message: >-
    Any capabilities added other than NET_BIND_SERVICE are disallow
ed.
  foreach:
  - list: request.object.spec.[ephemeralContainers, initContainers,
containers][]
    deny:
      conditions:
        any:
        - key: "{{ element.securityContext.capabilities.add || `[]`
}}"
          operator: AnyNotIn
          value:
            - NET_BIND_SERVICE

```

## Policy 5: Require Non-Root Containers

Ensure containers run as non-root users:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: require-run-as-nonroot
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Require Run As Non-Root User
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Restricted)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Containers must run as a non-root user. This policy ensures runAsNo
nRoot is set to true.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: run-as-non-root
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
            validate:
              message: >-
                Running as root is not allowed. Either the field securityC
ontext.runAsNonRoot
                must be set to true, or the field spec.containers[*].securityCo
ntext.runAsNonRoot
                must be set to true.
              anyPattern:
                - spec:
                    securityContext:
                      runAsNonRoot: "true"
                - spec:
                    containers:
                      - securityContext:
                          runAsNonRoot: "true"

```

## Advanced Scenarios

# Scenario 1: Environment-Specific Policies

Different security levels for different environments:

This area is reserved for the content of the Container Escape Prevention Policy. It is currently blank.

```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: environment-container-security
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    # Production: Strict security
    - name: production-strict-security
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              namespaces:
                - production
                - prod-*
      validate:
        message: "Production environments require strict container security"
        pattern:
          spec:
            =(hostPID): "false"
            =(hostIPC): "false"
            =(hostNetwork): "false"
            securityContext:
              runAsNonRoot: "true"
            containers:
          - securityContext:
              privileged: "false"
              runAsNonRoot: "true"
              capabilities:
                drop:
                  - ALL

    # Development: More permissive but still secure
    - name: development-basic-security
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
```

```
    namespaces:
      - development
      - dev-*
      - staging
  validate:
    message: "Development environments require basic container security"
  pattern:
    spec:
      =(hostPID): "false"
      =(hostIPC): "false"
    containers:
      - securityContext:
          =(privileged): "false"
```

## Scenario 2: Workload-Specific Exceptions

Allow specific workloads with controlled exceptions:

```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: workload-specific-security
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: system-workloads-exception
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      exclude:
        any:
          - resources:
              namespaces:
                - kube-system
                - kyverno
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              names:
                - "monitoring-*"
                - "logging-*"
      validate:
        message: "Container security policies apply to application worklo
ads"
        pattern:
          spec:
            =(hostNetwork): "false"
          containers:
            - securityContext:
                =(privileged): "false"
```

## Testing and Validation

### Test Privileged Container

```
# This should be blocked
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-privileged
spec:
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: nginx
    securityContext:
      privileged: true
EOF
```

## Test Host Namespace Access

```
# This should be blocked
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-host-network
spec:
  hostNetwork: true
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: nginx
EOF
```

## Test Host Path Mount

```
# This should be blocked
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-hostpath
spec:
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: nginx
    volumeMounts:
    - name: host-vol
      mountPath: /host
  volumes:
  - name: host-vol
    hostPath:
      path: /
EOF
```

## Test Valid Secure Container

```
# This should be allowed
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-secure
spec:
  securityContext:
    runAsNonRoot: true
    runAsUser: 1000
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: nginx
    securityContext:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      capabilities:
        drop:
        - ALL
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
      runAsNonRoot: true
      runAsUser: 1000
EOF
```

## Best Practices

### 1. Start with Audit Mode

```
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Audit # Start with warnings, not blocking
```

### 2. Exclude System Namespaces

**exclude:**

**any:**

- **resources:**

**namespaces:**

- kube-system
- kyverno
- kube-public

# Security Context Enforcement Policy

This guide demonstrates how to configure Kyverno to enforce proper security contexts for containers, ensuring they run with appropriate security settings and restrictions.

## TOC

### [What is Security Context Enforcement?](#)

#### Quick Start

1. Require Non-Root Containers Policy
2. Test the Policy

#### Core Security Context Policies

Policy 1: Disallow Privilege Escalation

Policy 2: Require Specific User ID Range

Policy 3: Require Non-Root Groups

Policy 4: Restrict Seccomp Profiles

Policy 5: Require Dropping ALL Capabilities

Policy 6: Restrict AppArmor Profiles

#### Advanced Scenarios

Scenario 1: Environment-Specific Security Contexts

Scenario 2: Application-Specific Security Contexts

Scenario 3: Graduated Security Context Enforcement

Scenario 4: Specified Namespace Security Context Enforcement

#### Testing and Validation

Test Root Container (Should Fail)

Test Privilege Escalation (Should Fail)

Test Missing Capabilities Drop (Should Fail)

Test Valid Secure Container (Should Pass)

---

## What is Security Context Enforcement?

Security context enforcement involves controlling how containers run by setting security-related parameters. Proper security context configuration prevents:

- **Root privilege escalation:** Containers running as root user
- **Privilege escalation attacks:** Containers gaining elevated permissions
- **Insecure process execution:** Containers running with dangerous capabilities
- **Filesystem tampering:** Containers with writable root filesystems
- **Security bypass:** Containers circumventing security mechanisms

## Quick Start

### 1. Require Non-Root Containers Policy

---

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: require-run-as-nonroot
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Require Run As Non-Root User
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Restricted)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Containers must run as a non-root user. This policy ensures runAsNo
nRoot is set to true.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: run-as-non-root
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
            validate:
              message: >-
                Running as root is not allowed. Either the field securityC
ontext.runAsNonRoot
                must be set to true, or the field spec.containers[*].securityCo
ntext.runAsNonRoot
                must be set to true.
              anyPattern:
                - spec:
                    securityContext:
                      runAsNonRoot: "true"
                - spec:
                    containers:
                      - securityContext:
                          runAsNonRoot: "true"

```

## 2. Test the Policy

```
# Apply the policy
kubectl apply -f require-run-as-nonroot.yaml

# Try to create a container explicitly running as root (should fail)
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-root
spec:
  containers:
  - name: nginx
    image: nginx
    securityContext:
      runAsUser: 0
      runAsNonRoot: false
EOF

# Try to create a container with non-root user (should work)
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-nonroot
spec:
  securityContext:
    runAsNonRoot: true
    runAsUser: 1000
  containers:
  - name: nginx
    image: nginx
EOF

# Clean up
kubectl delete pod test-root test-nonroot --ignore-not-found
```

## Core Security Context Policies

### Policy 1: Disallow Privilege Escalation

Prevent containers from escalating privileges:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: disallow-privilege-escalation
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow Privilege Escalation
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Restricted)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Privilege escalation, such as via set-user-ID or set-group-ID file
      mode, should not be allowed.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: privilege-escalation
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: >-
          Privilege escalation is disallowed. The fields
          spec.containers[*].securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalation,
          spec.initContainers[*].securityContext.allowPrivilegeEscalatio
n,
          and spec.ephemeralContainers[*].securityContext.allowPrivilegeE
scalation
          must be set to false.
        pattern:
          spec:
            =(ephemeralContainers):
              - securityContext:
                  allowPrivilegeEscalation: "false"
            =(initContainers):
              - securityContext:
                  allowPrivilegeEscalation: "false"
          containers:
            - securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: "false"

```

## **Policy 2: Require Specific User ID Range**

Ensure containers run with specific user IDs:



```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: require-user-id-range
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Require User ID Range
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Restricted)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Containers must run with a specific user ID range to prevent privile
      ege escalation.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: user-id-range
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
            validate:
              message: >-
                Containers must run with user ID between 1000 and 65535.
              deny:
                conditions:
                  any:
                    # Check pod-level security context
                    - key: "{{ request.object.spec.securityContext.runAsUser || 0
}}}
                    operator: LessThan
                    value: 1000
                    - key: "{{ request.object.spec.securityContext.runAsUser || 0
}}}
                    operator: GreaterThan
                    value: 65535
                    # Check container-level security contexts
                    - key: "{{ request.object.spec.containers[?securityContext.ru
nAsUser && (securityContext.runAsUser < `1000` || securityContext.runAsUs
er > `65535`)] | length(@) }}"
                    operator: GreaterThan
                    value: 0

```

## Policy 3: Require Non-Root Groups

Ensure containers run with non-root group IDs:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: require-non-root-groups
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Require Non-Root Groups
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Restricted)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Containers should be required to run with a non-root group ID or su
pplemental groups.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: non-root-groups
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
            validate:
              message: >-
                Containers must run with non-root group ID. Either spec.securit
yContext.runAsGroup
                or spec.containers[*].securityContext.runAsGroup must be set an
d not be 0.
              deny:
                conditions:
                  any:
                    # Check if pod-level runAsGroup is 0
                    - key: "{{ request.object.spec.securityContext.runAsGroup ||
0 }}"
                      operator: Equals
                      value: 0
                    # Check if any container has runAsGroup set to 0
                    - key: "{{ request.object.spec.containers[?securityContext.ru
nAsGroup == `0`] | length(@) }}"
                      operator: GreaterThan
                      value: 0

```

## Policy 4: Restrict Seccomp Profiles

Enforce secure seccomp profiles:



```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: restrict-seccomp-strict
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Restrict Seccomp (Strict)
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Restricted)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Seccomp profile must be explicitly set to one of the allowed value
s.
      Both the Unconfined profile and the absence of a profile are prohib
ited.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: seccomp-strict
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: >-
          Use of custom Seccomp profiles is disallowed. The field
          spec.securityContext.seccompProfile.type must be set to Runtime
Default or Localhost.
        anyPattern:
          - spec:
              securityContext:
                seccompProfile:
                  type: RuntimeDefault
          - spec:
              securityContext:
                seccompProfile:
                  type: Localhost
          - spec:
              containers:
                - securityContext:
                    seccompProfile:
                      type: RuntimeDefault

```

```
- spec:  
  containers:  
    - securityContext:  
      seccompProfile:  
        type: Localhost
```

## Policy 5: Require Dropping ALL Capabilities

Ensure containers drop all capabilities:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: require-drop-all-capabilities
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Require Drop ALL Capabilities
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Restricted)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Containers must drop all capabilities and only add back those that
      are specifically needed.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: require-drop-all
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: >-
          Containers must drop ALL capabilities.
        foreach:
          - list: request.object.spec.[ephemeralContainers, initContainers,
containers][ ]
            deny:
              conditions:
                all:
                  - key: ALL
                    operator: AnyNotIn
                    value: "{{ element.securityContext.capabilities.drop | `
[ ]` }}"

```

## Policy 6: Restrict AppArmor Profiles

Control AppArmor profile usage:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: restrict-apparmor-profiles
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Restrict AppArmor Profiles
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      On supported hosts, the runtime/default AppArmor profile is applied
      by default.
      The baseline policy should prevent overriding or disabling the default AppArmor profile.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: apparmor-profiles
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: >-
          AppArmor profile must be set to runtime/default or a custom profile.
          Unconfined profiles are not allowed.
      pattern:
        metadata:
          =(annotations):
            =(container.apparmor.security.beta.kubernetes.io/*): "!unconfined"

```

## Advanced Scenarios

### Scenario 1: Environment-Specific Security Contexts

Different security requirements for different environments:




```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: environment-security-contexts
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    # Production: Strict security contexts
    - name: production-strict-security
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              namespaces:
                - production
                - prod-*
      validate:
        message: "Production environments require strict security contexts"
        pattern:
          spec:
            securityContext:
              runAsNonRoot: "true"
              runAsUser: "1000-65535"
              runAsGroup: "1000-65535"
              seccompProfile:
                type: RuntimeDefault
            containers:
          - securityContext:
              allowPrivilegeEscalation: "false"
              readOnlyRootFilesystem: "true"
              runAsNonRoot: "true"
              capabilities:
                drop:
                  - ALL

    # Development: Basic security requirements
    - name: development-basic-security
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
```

```
kinds:  
  - Pod  
namespaces:  
  - development  
  - dev-  
  - staging  
validate:  
  message: "Development environments require basic security context  
s"  
  pattern:  
    spec:  
      containers:  
        - securityContext:  
            allowPrivilegeEscalation: "false"  
            runAsNonRoot: "true"
```

## Scenario 2: Application-Specific Security Contexts

Different security contexts for different application types:




```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: application-security-contexts
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    # Database applications: Specific user/group IDs
    - name: database-security-context
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              selector:
                matchLabels:
                  app.type: database
      validate:
        message: "Database applications must use specific security contexts"
        pattern:
          spec:
            securityContext:
              runAsUser: "999"
              runAsGroup: "999"
              fsGroup: "999"
            containers:
              - securityContext:
                  runAsNonRoot: "true"
                  readOnlyRootFilesystem: "true"

    # Web applications: Standard security context
    - name: web-app-security-context
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              selector:
                matchLabels:
                  app.type: web
      validate:
```

```
message: "Web applications must use standard security contexts"
pattern:
  spec:
    containers:
      - securityContext:
          runAsNonRoot: "true"
          allowPrivilegeEscalation: "false"
          capabilities:
            drop:
              - ALL
            add:
              - NET_BIND_SERVICE
```

## Scenario 3: Graduated Security Context Enforcement

Implement progressive security context requirements:



```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: graduated-security-contexts
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    # Level 1: Basic security (all namespaces)
    - name: basic-security-level
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      exclude:
        any:
          - resources:
              namespaces:
                - kube-system
                - kyverno
      validate:
        message: "All containers must have basic security contexts"
        pattern:
          spec:
            containers:
              - securityContext:
                  allowPrivilegeEscalation: "false"

    # Level 2: Enhanced security (sensitive namespaces)
    - name: enhanced-security-level
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              namespaces:
                - finance-*
                - hr-*
                - security-*
      validate:
        message: "Sensitive namespaces require enhanced security context
```

```
s"
```

```


pattern:
  spec:
    securityContext:
      runAsNonRoot: "true"
    containers:
      - securityContext:
          readOnlyRootFilesystem: "true"
          capabilities:
            drop:
              - ALL

# Level 3: Maximum security (critical namespaces)
- name: maximum-security-level
  match:
    any:
      - resources:
          kinds:
            - Pod
          namespaces:
            - critical-*
            - payment-*
  validate:
    message: "Critical namespaces require maximum security contexts"
    pattern:
      spec:
        securityContext:
          runAsNonRoot: "true"
          runAsUser: "1000-1999"
          runAsGroup: "1000-1999"
          seccompProfile:
            type: RuntimeDefault
        containers:
          - securityContext:
              allowPrivilegeEscalation: "false"
              readOnlyRootFilesystem: "true"
              runAsNonRoot: "true"
              capabilities:
                drop:
                  - ALL

```

## Scenario 4: Specified Namespace Security Context Enforcement

Implementing label-based namespace security policy injection:



```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: Policy
metadata:
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards
    policies.kyverno.io/description: 'Strictly follow the Security Context configuration in the image to automatically add, allowPrivilegeEscalation:
      false, capabilities drop ALL, runAsNonRoot: true, seccompProfile:
RuntimeDefault'
    policies.kyverno.io/minversion: 1.13.0
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Add precise Security Context configuration
  creationTimestamp: "2025-06-04T03:26:54Z"
  generation: 1
  labels:
    velero.io/backup-name: app-backup-20250604111354
    velero.io/restore-name: app-recovery
  name: add-exact-security-context
  namespace: test-1
spec:
  admission: true
  background: true
  emitWarning: false
  rules:
  - match:
      any:
      - resources:
          kinds:
            - Pod
        context:
          - name: namespaceInfo
            apiCall:
                urlPath: "/api/v1/namespaces/{{request.namespace}}"
                jmesPath: "metadata.labels.\`pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce\`"
    || 'restricted'
  preconditions:
    all:
    - key: "{{ namespaceInfo }}"
      operator: NotEquals
      value: "privileged"
  mutate:
    -

```

```

foreach:
- list: request.object.spec.containers
  patchStrategicMerge:
    spec:
      containers:
      - name: '{{ element.name }}'
        securityContext:
          allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
          capabilities:
            drop:
            - ALL
          runAsNonRoot: true
          seccompProfile:
            type: RuntimeDefault
name: add-container-security-context
skipBackgroundRequests: true
- match:
  any:
  - resources:
    kinds:
    - Pod
  context:
  - name: namespaceInfo
    apiCall:
      urlPath: "/api/v1/namespaces/{{request.namespace}}"
      jmesPath: "metadata.labels.\"pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce\"
|| 'restricted'"
  preconditions:
    all:
    - key: "{{ namespaceInfo }}"
      operator: NotEquals
      value: "privileged"
    - key: '{{ request.object.spec.initContainers || `[]` | length(@)
}}'
      operator: GreaterThan
      value: 0
  mutate:
    foreach:
    - list: request.object.spec.initContainers
      patchStrategicMerge:
        spec:
          initContainers:
          - name: '{{ element.name }}'
            securityContext:

```

```

        allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
        capabilities:
          drop:
            - ALL
        runAsNonRoot: true
        seccompProfile:
          type: RuntimeDefault
name: add-init-container-security-context
skipBackgroundRequests: true
- match:
  any:
    - resources:
      kinds:
        - Pod
context:
- name: namespaceInfo
  apiCall:
    urlPath: "/api/v1/namespaces/{{request.namespace}}"
    jmesPath: "metadata.labels.\`pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce\`"
|| 'restricted'
preconditions:
  all:
    - key: "{{ namespaceInfo }}"
      operator: NotEquals
      value: "privileged"
    - key: '{{ request.object.spec.ephemeralContainers || `[]` | length
(@) }}'
      operator: GreaterThan
      value: 0
mutate:
  foreach:
    - list: request.object.spec.ephemeralContainers
      patchStrategicMerge:
        spec:
          ephemeralContainers:
            - name: '{{ element.name }}'
              securityContext:
                allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
                capabilities:
                  drop:
                    - ALL
                runAsNonRoot: true
                seccompProfile:
                  type: RuntimeDefault

```

```
name: add-ephemeral-container-security-context
skipBackgroundRequests: true
validationFailureAction: Audit
```

If you do not expect certain namespaces to be injected with security context detection, please add the label for namespace `pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: privileged`

## Testing and Validation

### Test Root Container (Should Fail)

```
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-root-user
spec:
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: nginx
    securityContext:
      runAsUser: 0
EOF
```

### Test Privilege Escalation (Should Fail)

```
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-privilege-escalation
spec:
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: nginx
    securityContext:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
EOF
```

## Test Missing Capabilities Drop (Should Fail)

```
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-missing-drop-all
spec:
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: nginx
    securityContext:
      capabilities:
        add:
        - NET_ADMIN
EOF
```

## Test Valid Secure Container (Should Pass)

```
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-secure-context
spec:
  securityContext:
    runAsNonRoot: true
    runAsUser: 1000
    runAsGroup: 1000
    seccompProfile:
      type: RuntimeDefault
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: nginx
    securityContext:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
      runAsNonRoot: true
      runAsUser: 1000
      capabilities:
        drop:
          - ALL
        add:
          - NET_BIND_SERVICE
```

EOF

# Network Security Policy

This guide demonstrates how to configure Kyverno to enforce network security policies that control container network access and prevent network-based attacks.

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---

## What is Network Security?

Network security involves controlling how containers access and interact with network resources. Proper network security prevents:

- **Host network access:** Containers accessing host network interfaces
- **Privilege escalation via networking:** Using network access to gain elevated permissions
- **Port scanning and reconnaissance:** Unauthorized network discovery activities
- **Lateral movement:** Containers accessing unintended network resources
- **Data exfiltration:** Unauthorized network communications

## Quick Start

### 1. Disallow Host Network Access

---

```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: disallow-host-network
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow Host Network
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Access to the host network allows potential snooping of network tra
      ffic and should not be allowed.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: host-network
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: >-
          Use of host network is disallowed. The field spec.hostNetwork m
          ust be unset or set to false.
        pattern:
          spec:
            =(hostNetwork): "false"
```

## 2. Test the Policy

```
# Apply the policy
kubectl apply -f disallow-host-network.yaml

# Try to create a pod with host network (should fail)
kubectl run test-hostnet --image=nginx --overrides='{"spec":{"hostNetwork":true}}'

# Try to create a normal pod (should work)
kubectl run test-normal --image=nginx
```

## Core Network Security Policies

### Policy 1: Disallow Host Ports

Prevent containers from binding to host network ports:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: disallow-host-ports
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow Host Ports
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Access to host ports allows potential snooping of network traffic a
nd should not be
      allowed, or at minimum restricted to a known list.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: host-ports-none
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
            validate:
              message: >-
                Use of host ports is disallowed. The fields spec.containers[*].
ports[*].hostPort,
                spec.initContainers[*].ports[*].hostPort, and spec.ephemeralCon
tainers[*].ports[*].hostPort
                must either be unset or set to 0.
              pattern:
                spec:
                  =(ephemeralContainers):
                    -(ports):
                      =(hostPort): 0
                  =(initContainers):
                    -(ports):
                      =(hostPort): 0
                containers:
                  -(ports):
                    =(hostPort): 0

```

## Policy 2: Restrict Host Port Range

Allow specific host port ranges for controlled access:





```
operator: LessThan  
value: 30000  
- key: "{{ element.hostPort }}"  
operator: GreaterThan  
value: 32767
```

## Policy 3: Require Network Policies

Ensure pods have associated NetworkPolicies for traffic control:



```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: require-network-policies
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Require Network Policies
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Network Security
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod,NetworkPolicy
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Pods should have associated NetworkPolicies to control network traf
fic.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: false
  rules:
    - name: require-netpol
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
            exclude:
              any:
                - resources:
                    namespaces:
                      - kube-system
                      - kyverno
      context:
        - name: netpols
          apiCall:
            urlPath: "/apis/networking.k8s.io/v1/namespaces/{{ request.name
space }}/networkpolicies"
            jmesPath: "items[?spec.podSelector.matchLabels.app == '{{ reques
t.object.metadata.labels.app }}'] | length(@)"
          validate:
            message: >-
              Pods must have an associated NetworkPolicy. Create a NetworkPol
icity that selects this pod.
            deny:
              conditions:
                all:
                  - key: "{{ netpols }}"

```

operator: Equals  
value: 0

## Policy 4: Restrict Service Types

Control which service types can be created:



```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: restrict-service-types
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Restrict Service Types
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Network Security
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Service
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Restrict Service types to prevent exposure of services to external
networks.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: restrict-nodeport
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Service
            validate:
              message: >-
                NodePort services are not allowed. Use ClusterIP or LoadBalance
r instead.
              pattern:
                spec:
                  type: "!NodePort"
    - name: restrict-loadbalancer
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Service
              namespaces:
                - development
                - dev-*
                - staging
            validate:
              message: >-
                LoadBalancer services are not allowed in development environmen
ts.
```

```
pattern:  
  spec:  
    type: "!LoadBalancer"
```

## Policy 5: Control Ingress Configurations

Enforce secure Ingress configurations:



```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: secure-ingress-configuration
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Secure Ingress Configuration
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Network Security
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Ingress
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Ingress resources must be configured securely with TLS and proper a
nnotations.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: require-tls
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Ingress
      validate:
        message: >-
          Ingress must use TLS. The field spec.tls must be specified.
        pattern:
          spec:
            tls:
              - hosts:
                  - "*"
    - name: require-security-annotations
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Ingress
      validate:
        message: >-
          Ingress must have security annotations for SSL redirect and HST
S.
        pattern:
          metadata:
            annotations:

```

```
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/ssl-redirect: "true"  
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/force-ssl-redirect: "true"
```

## Policy 6: Restrict DNS Configuration

Control DNS settings to prevent DNS-based attacks:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: restrict-dns-configuration
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Restrict DNS Configuration
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Network Security
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Restrict DNS configuration to prevent DNS hijacking and data exfiltration.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: restrict-dns-policy
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: >-
          Custom DNS policy is not allowed. Use Default or ClusterFirst only.
        pattern:
          spec:
            =(dnsPolicy): "Default | ClusterFirst"
    - name: restrict-custom-dns
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: >-
          Custom DNS configuration is not allowed in production environments.
        pattern:
          spec:
            X(dnsConfig): "null"

```

# Advanced Scenarios

## Scenario 1: Environment-Specific Network Policies

Different network restrictions for different environments:



```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: environment-network-security
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    # Production: Strict network controls
    - name: production-network-restrictions
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              namespaces:
                - production
                - prod-*
      validate:
        message: "Production environments require strict network security"
        pattern:
          spec:
            hostNetwork: "false"
            dnsPolicy: "ClusterFirst"
            containers:
              - ports:
                  - =(hostPort): 0

    # Development: Basic network security
    - name: development-network-restrictions
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              namespaces:
                - development
                - dev-*
                - staging
      validate:
        message: "Development environments require basic network security"
```

```
pattern:  
  spec:  
    hostNetwork: "false"
```

## Scenario 2: Application-Specific Network Policies

Different network policies for different application types:



```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: application-network-policies
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    # Database applications: No external network access
    - name: database-network-policy
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              selector:
                matchLabels:
                  app.type: database
      validate:
        message: "Database applications cannot use host network or host ports"
        pattern:
          spec:
            hostNetwork: "false"
            containers:
              - ports:
                  - =(hostPort): 0

    # Web applications: Controlled port access
    - name: web-app-network-policy
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              selector:
                matchLabels:
                  app.type: web
      validate:
        message: "Web applications can only use standard HTTP/HTTPS ports"
        foreach:
          - list: request.object.spec.containers[].ports[]
```

```
deny:
  conditions:
    any:
      - key: "{{ element.containerPort }}"
        operator: AnyNotIn
        value:
          - 80
          - 443
          - 8080
          - 8443
```

## Scenario 3: Network Segmentation Enforcement

Enforce network segmentation between different tiers:



```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: network-segmentation-enforcement
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: frontend-backend-separation
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              selector:
                matchLabels:
                  tier: frontend
      validate:
        message: "Frontend pods cannot access backend network directly"
        deny:
          conditions:
            any:
              - key: "{{ request.object.metadata.labels.tier }}"
                operator: Equals
                value: backend
    - name: require-network-labels
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      exclude:
        any:
          - resources:
              namespaces:
                - kube-system
                - kyverno
      validate:
        message: "Pods must have network tier labels for segmentation"
        pattern:
          metadata:
            labels:
              tier: "frontend | backend | database"
```

# Testing and Validation

## Test Host Network Access (Should Fail)

```
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-host-network
spec:
  hostNetwork: true
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: nginx
EOF
```

## Test Host Port Binding (Should Fail)

```
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-host-port
spec:
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: nginx
    ports:
    - containerPort: 80
      hostPort: 8080
EOF
```

## Test NodePort Service (Should Fail)

```
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -  
apiVersion: v1  
kind: Service  
metadata:  
  name: test-nodeport  
spec:  
  type: NodePort  
  ports:  
  - port: 80  
    targetPort: 80  
    nodePort: 30080  
  selector:  
    app: test  
EOF
```

## Test Valid Network Configuration (Should Pass)

```
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-secure-network
  labels:
    app: web-app
    tier: frontend
spec:
  dnsPolicy: ClusterFirst
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: nginx
    ports:
    - containerPort: 80
      protocol: TCP
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
  name: test-service
spec:
  type: ClusterIP
  ports:
  - port: 80
    targetPort: 80
  selector:
    app: web-app
EOF
```

# Volume Security Policy

This guide demonstrates how to configure Kyverno to enforce volume security policies that restrict dangerous volume types and configurations that could compromise container security.

---

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#### Advanced Scenarios

- Scenario 1: Environment-Specific Volume Policies
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#### Testing and Validation

- Test HostPath Volume (Should Fail)
-

# What is Volume Security?

Volume security involves controlling which types of volumes containers can mount and how they can access them. Proper volume security prevents:

- **Host filesystem access:** Unauthorized access to host directories
- **Privilege escalation:** Using volumes to gain elevated permissions
- **Data exfiltration:** Accessing sensitive host data through volume mounts
- **Container escape:** Breaking out of container isolation via volume access
- **Insecure volume types:** Using volume types that bypass security controls

## Quick Start

### 1. Restrict Volume Types



```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: restrict-volume-types
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Restrict Volume Types
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Restricted)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod,Volume
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Only allow safe volume types. This policy restricts volumes to configMap, csi,
      downwardAPI, emptyDir, ephemeral, persistentVolumeClaim, projected,
      and secret.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: restrict-volume-types
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
            validate:
              message: >-
                Only the following types of volumes may be used: configMap, csi,
                downwardAPI,
                emptyDir, ephemeral, persistentVolumeClaim, projected, and secret.
      foreach:
        - list: "request.object.spec.volumes || []"
          deny:
            conditions:
              all:
                - key: "{{ element.keys(@) }}"
                  operator: AnyNotIn
                  value:
                    - name
                    - configMap
                    - csi
                    - downwardAPI
                    - emptyDir

```

- ephemeral
- persistentVolumeClaim
- projected
- secret

## 2. Test the Policy



```
# Apply the policy
kubect1 apply -f restrict-volume-types.yaml

# Try to create a pod with hostPath volume (should fail)
cat <<EOF | kubect1 apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-hostpath
spec:
  containers:
  - name: nginx
    image: nginx
    volumeMounts:
    - name: host-vol
      mountPath: /host
  volumes:
  - name: host-vol
    hostPath:
      path: /
EOF

# Create a test ConfigMap first
kubect1 create configmap test-config --from-literal=key=value

# Try to create a pod with allowed volume (should work)
cat <<EOF | kubect1 apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: test-configmap
spec:
  containers:
  - name: nginx
    image: nginx
    volumeMounts:
    - name: config-vol
      mountPath: /config
  volumes:
  - name: config-vol
    configMap:
      name: test-config
EOF
```

```
# Clean up
```

```
kubectl delete pod test-hostpath test-configmap --ignore-not-found
```

```
kubectl delete configmap test-config --ignore-not-found
```

## Core Volume Security Policies

### Policy 1: Disallow HostPath Volumes

Prevent containers from mounting host filesystem paths:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: disallow-host-path
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow Host Path
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod,Volume
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      HostPath volumes let Pods use host directories and volumes in containers.
      Using host resources can be used to access shared data or escalate privileges
      and should not be allowed.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: host-path
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
            validate:
              message: >-
                HostPath volumes are forbidden. The field spec.volumes[*].hostPath must be unset.
              pattern:
                spec:
                  =(volumes):
                    - X(hostPath): "null"

```

## Policy 2: Restrict HostPath Volumes (Controlled Access)

Allow specific hostPath volumes with read-only access:



```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: restrict-host-path-readonly
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Restrict Host Path (Read-Only)
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod,Volume
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      HostPath volumes which are allowed must be read-only and restricted
to specific paths.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: host-path-readonly
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      preconditions:
        all:
          - key: "{{ request.object.spec.volumes[?hostPath] | length(@) }}"
            operator: GreaterThan
            value: 0
      validate:
        message: >-
          HostPath volumes must be read-only and limited to allowed path
s.
        foreach:
          - list: "request.object.spec.volumes[?hostPath]"
            deny:
              conditions:
                any:
                  # Deny if path is not in allowed list
                  - key: "{{ element.hostPath.path }}"
                    operator: AnyNotIn
                    value:
                      - "/var/log"
                      - "/var/lib/docker/containers"
                      - "/proc"

```

```
- "/sys"
foreach:
- list: "request.object.spec.containers[].volumeMounts[?name]"
deny:
  conditions:
    any:
      # Deny if volume mount is not read-only
      - key: "{{ element.readOnly || false }}"
        operator: Equals
        value: false
```

## Policy 3: Disallow Privileged Volume Types

Block volume types that can bypass security controls:



```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: disallow-privileged-volumes
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow Privileged Volume Types
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: high
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod,Volume
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Certain volume types are considered privileged and should not be al
      lowed.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: disallow-privileged-volumes
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: >-
          Privileged volume types are not allowed: hostPath, gcePersisten
          tDisk,
          awsElasticBlockStore, gitRepo, nfs, iscsi, glusterfs, rbd, flex
          Volume,
          cinder, cephFS, flocker, fc, azureFile, azureDisk, vsphereVolum
          e, quobyte,
          portworxVolume, scaleIO, storageos.
      foreach:
        - list: "request.object.spec.volumes || []"
          deny:
            conditions:
              any:
                - key: "{{ element.keys(@) }}"
                  operator: AnyIn
                  value:
                    - hostPath
                    - gcePersistentDisk
                    - awsElasticBlockStore
                    - gitRepo

```

- nfs
- iscsi
- glusterfs
- rbd
- flexVolume
- cinder
- cephFS
- flocker
- fc
- azureFile
- azureDisk
- vsphereVolume
- quobyte
- portworxVolume
- scaleIO
- storageos

## Policy 4: Require Read-Only Root Filesystem

Ensure containers use read-only root filesystems:

```

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: require-readonly-rootfs
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Require Read-Only Root Filesystem
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Restricted)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      A read-only root file system helps to enforce an immutable infrastr
ucture strategy;
      the container only needs to write on the mounted volume that persis
ts the state.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: readonly-rootfs
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
            validate:
              message: >-
                Root filesystem must be read-only. Set readOnlyRootFilesystem t
o true.
              foreach:
                - list: request.object.spec.[ephemeralContainers, initContainers,
containers][]
                  deny:
                    conditions:
                      any:
                        - key: "{{ element.securityContext.readOnlyRootFilesystem |
| false }}"
                          operator: Equals
                          value: false

```

## Policy 5: Control Volume Mount Permissions

Restrict volume mount permissions and paths:



```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: control-volume-mounts
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Control Volume Mount Permissions
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Restricted)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod,Volume
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      Control where volumes can be mounted and with what permissions.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: restrict-mount-paths
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
            validate:
              message: >-
                Volume mounts to sensitive paths are not allowed.
              foreach:
                - list: request.object.spec.[ephemeralContainers, initContainers,
containers][].volumeMounts[]
                  deny:
                    conditions:
                      any:
                        # Block mounts to sensitive system paths
                        - key: "{{ element.mountPath }}"
                          operator: AnyIn
                          value:
                            - "/etc"
                            - "/root"
                            - "/var/run/docker.sock"
                            - "/var/lib/kubelet"
                            - "/var/lib/docker"
                            - "/usr/bin"
                            - "/usr/sbin"
                            - "/sbin"
                            - "/bin"
```

```
- name: require-readonly-sensitive-mounts
match:
  any:
    - resources:
        kinds:
          - Pod
  validate:
    message: >-
      Mounts to /proc and /sys must be read-only.
    foreach:
      - list: request.object.spec.[ephemeralContainers, initContainers,
containers][].volumeMounts[]
        preconditions:
          any:
            - key: "{{ element.mountPath }}"
              operator: AnyIn
              value:
                - "/proc"
                - "/sys"
          deny:
            conditions:
              any:
                - key: "{{ element.readOnly || false }}"
                  operator: Equals
                  value: false
```

## Advanced Scenarios

### Scenario 1: Environment-Specific Volume Policies

Different volume restrictions for different environments:



```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: environment-volume-security
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    # Production: Strict volume controls
    - name: production-volume-restrictions
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              namespaces:
                - production
                - prod-*
      validate:
        message: "Production environments allow only secure volume types"
        foreach:
          - list: "request.object.spec.volumes || []"
            deny:
              conditions:
                all:
                  - key: "{{ element.keys(@) }}"
                    operator: AnyNotIn
                    value:
                      - name
                      - configMap
                      - secret
                      - persistentVolumeClaim
                      - emptyDir

    # Development: More permissive but still secure
    - name: development-volume-restrictions
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              namespaces:
                - development
```

```
- dev-*
- staging
validate:
  message: "Development environments allow additional volume types"
  foreach:
    - list: "request.object.spec.volumes || []"
      deny:
        conditions:
          any:
            - key: "{{ element.keys(@) }}"
              operator: AnyIn
              value:
                - hostPath # Still block hostPath in dev
                - nfs      # Block network filesystems
```

## Scenario 2: Application-Specific Volume Policies

Different volume policies for different application types:



```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: application-volume-policies
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    # Database applications: Allow persistent storage
    - name: database-volume-policy
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              selector:
                matchLabels:
                  app.type: database
      validate:
        message: "Database applications must use persistent volumes"
        pattern:
          spec:
            volumes:
              - persistentVolumeClaim: {}

    # Web applications: Restrict to safe volumes
    - name: web-app-volume-policy
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
              selector:
                matchLabels:
                  app.type: web
      validate:
        message: "Web applications can only use safe volume types"
        foreach:
          - list: "request.object.spec.volumes || []"
            deny:
              conditions:
                all:
                  - key: "{{ element.keys(@) }}"
```

**operator:** AnyNotIn

**value:**

- name
- configMap
- secret
- emptyDir
- projected

## Scenario 3: Volume Size and Resource Limits

Control volume sizes and resource usage:

```
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: volume-resource-limits
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: limit-emptydir-size
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: "EmptyDir volumes must have size limits"
        foreach:
          - list: "request.object.spec.volumes[?emptyDir]"
            deny:
              conditions:
                any:
                  - key: "{{ element.emptyDir.sizeLimit || ' ' }}"
                    operator: Equals
                    value: ""
    - name: limit-emptydir-memory
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      validate:
        message: "EmptyDir memory volumes are not allowed"
        foreach:
          - list: "request.object.spec.volumes[?emptyDir]"
            deny:
              conditions:
                any:
                  - key: "{{ element.emptyDir.medium || ' ' }}"
                    operator: Equals
                    value: "Memory"
```

# Testing and Validation

## Test HostPath Volume (Should Fail)

```
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -  
apiVersion: v1  
kind: Pod  
metadata:  
  name: test-hostpath  
spec:  
  containers:  
  - name: nginx  
    image: nginx  
    volumeMounts:  
    - name: host-vol  
      mountPath: /host  
  volumes:  
  - name: host-vol  
    hostPath:  
      path: /  
EOF
```

# API Refiner

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# Introduction

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## Product Introduction

ACP API Refiner is a data filtering service provided by the Alauda Container Platform that enhances multi-tenant security and data isolation in Kubernetes environments. It filters Kubernetes API response data based on user permissions, projects, clusters, and namespaces, while also supporting field-level filtering, inclusion, and data desensitization.

## Limitations

The following limitations apply to ACP API Refiner:

- Resources must contain specific tenant-related labels for data isolation:
    - `cpaas.io/project`
    - `cpaas.io/cluster`
    - `cpaas.io/namespace`
-

- `kubernetes.io/metadata.name`
- Optional: `cpaas.io/creator`
- LabelSelector queries do not support logical OR operations
- Platform-level userbindings are not filtered
- Filtering is only applied to GET and LIST API operations

# Install Alauda Container Platform API Refiner

Alauda Container Platform API Refiner is a platform service that filters Kubernetes API response data. It provides filtering capabilities by project, cluster, and namespace, and supports field exclusion, inclusion, and desensitization in API responses.

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Install via YAML

1. Check available versions
2. Create a ModuleInfo

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Field Desensitization

## Install via console

1. Navigate to **Administrator**
2. In the left navigation bar, click **Marketplace > Cluster Plugins**

3. Select the **global** cluster in the top navigation bar
4. Search for **Alauda Container Platform API Refiner** and click to view its details
5. Click **Install** to deploy the plugin

## Install via YAML

### 1. Check available versions

Ensure the plugin has been published by checking for ModulePlugin and ModuleConfig resources, in `global` cluster :

```
# kubectl get moduleplugins apirefiner
NAME      AGE
apirefiner 4d20h

# kubectl get moduleconfigs -l cpaas.io/module-name=apirefiner
NAME              AGE
apirefiner-v4.0.4 4d21h
```

This indicates that the ModulePlugin `apirefiner` exists in the cluster and version `v4.0.4` is published.

### 2. Create a ModuleInfo

Create a ModuleInfo resource to install the plugin without any configuration parameters:

```

apiVersion: cluster.alauda.io/v1alpha1
kind: ModuleInfo
metadata:
  annotations:
    cpaas.io/display-name: apirefiner
    cpaas.io/module-name: '{"en": "Alauda Container Platform API Refiner", "zh": "Alauda Container Platform API Refiner"}'
  labels:
    cpaas.io/cluster-name: global
    cpaas.io/module-name: apirefiner
    cpaas.io/module-type: plugin
    cpaas.io/product: Platform-Center
  name: apirefiner-global
spec:
  version: v4.2.0-default.1.g8f0543e4

```

#### Field explanations:

- `name`: Temporary name for the cluster plugin. The platform will rename it after creation based on the content, in the format `<cluster-name>-<hash of content>`, e.g., `global-ee98c9991ea1464aaa8054bdacbab313`.
- `label cpaas.io/cluster-name`: API Refiner only can be installed in the `global` cluster, keep this filed as global.
- `label cpaas.io/module-name`: Plugin name, must match the ModulePlugin resource.
- `label cpaas.io/module-type`: Fixed field, must be `plugin`; missing this field causes installation failure.
- `.spec.config`: If the corresponding ModuleConfig is empty, this field can be left empty.
- `.spec.version`: Specifies the plugin version to install, must match `.spec.version` in ModuleConfig.

## Uninstallation Procedures

1. Follow steps 1-4 from the installation process to locate the plugin
2. Click **Uninstall** to remove the plugin

# Default Configuration

## Filtered Resources

The following resources are filtered by default:

Resource	API Version
namespaces	v1
projects	auth.alauda.io/v1
clustermodules	cluster.alauda.io/v1alpha2
clusters	clusterregistry.k8s.io/v1alpha1

## Field Desensitization

By default, the following field is desensitized:

- `metadata.annotations.cpaas.io/creator`

# Upgrade

## INFO

This document provides the upgrade path principles and supported version compatibility for Alauda Container Platform API Refiner.

## TOC

### [Compatibility Matrix](#)

[Upgrade Path Guidelines](#)

[Upgrade Alongside ACP](#)

[Minor Version Upgrade](#)

[Patch-Level Upgrade](#)

## Compatibility Matrix

The table below lists supported versions of the Alauda Container Platform API Refiner:

API Refiner Version	Supported Alauda Container Platform Version
4.3.x	4.2.x, 4.3.x

API Refiner Version	Supported Alauda Container Platform Version
4.2.x	4.2.x

## Upgrade Path Guidelines

### Upgrade Alongside ACP

- **Description:** In ACP 4.1.x and earlier releases, API Refiner plugins were lifecycle-aligned with ACP and were upgraded as part of the ACP release. For the following upgrade paths, the plugins are upgraded alongside ACP to version 4.3.0 during the ACP upgrade process.
- **Supported ACP Upgrade Paths:**
  - 4.0.x -> 4.3.0
  - 4.1.x -> 4.3.0
- **Result:** After the upgrade is completed, all API Refiner plugins are upgraded to version 4.3.0.

### Minor Version Upgrade

- **Description:** API Refiner plugins support minor version upgrades when ACP is on a compatible version.
- **Prerequisite:** ACP version must satisfy the compatibility matrix above.
- **Example:** 4.2.x -> 4.3.x

### Patch-Level Upgrade

- **Description:** Upgrades between any patch versions within the same minor version are fully compatible and can be performed directly.
- **Example:** 4.3.0 -> 4.3.x

# About Alauda Container Platform Compliance Service

Compliance Service is a platform module designed to support STIG compliance scanning and MicroOS operating system scanning. It provides out-of-the-box compliance scanning capabilities with support for scheduled scanning and comprehensive reporting.

## Note

Because Compliance Service releases on a different cadence from Alauda Container Platform, the Compliance Service documentation is now available as a separate documentation set at [Compliance Service](#).

# Platform Security Configurations

## [Changing the Platform OIDC CI](#)

Prerequisites

OIDC Secret Overview

Procedure

Rollback

## [Disabling the PKCE Plain Method](#)

Prerequisites

Procedure

Verification

Rollback

# Changing the Platform OIDC Client Secret

ACP uses an OIDC Client Secret for authentication between platform components. You may need to rotate this secret for security compliance, periodic credential rotation, or after a potential credential leak. After updating the secret on the global cluster, the platform automatically synchronizes it to all member clusters.

## TOC

### Prerequisites

OIDC Secret Overview

Procedure

Back up the current secret

Update the Client Secret

Verify component health

Rollback

## Prerequisites

- `kubectl` access to the **global cluster** with cluster-admin privileges.
- All clusters managed by the platform have been upgraded to ACP v4.3.
- The following plugins with the `Agnostic` life cycle have been upgraded to versions compatible with ACP v4.3:

- `Alauda Container Platform Gitops`
  - `Alauda Build of Kiali`
  - `Kubeflow Base`
  - `Alauda AI`
- A new client secret value prepared. It is recommended to use a cryptographically random string of at least 32 characters.

### WARNING

Changing the Client Secret causes affected components to restart, resulting in temporary authentication disruptions. Plan this operation during a maintenance window.

## OIDC Secret Overview

The platform OIDC credential is stored in a Kubernetes Secret with the following details:

Property	Value
Secret Name	<code>cpaas-oidc-secret</code>
Namespace	<code>cpaas-system</code>

The Secret contains two data keys:

- `client-id` — The OIDC client identifier, with the default value `alauda-auth`. **Do not modify this value.**
- `client-secret` — The OIDC client secret. This is the value you will rotate.

## Procedure

- 1 **Back up the current secret**

Before making changes, back up the current Secret manifest so you can roll back if needed.

```
kubectl get secret cpaas-oidc-secret -n cpaas-system -o yaml > cpaas-oidc-secret-backup.yaml
```

### WARNING

The backup file contains sensitive credential data. Store it in a secure location and delete it after the operation is complete.

Record the current `client-secret` hash for non-plaintext verification after the update:

```
OLD_SECRET_SHA256="$(kubectl get secret cpaas-oidc-secret -n cpaas-system \
  -o jsonpath='{.data.client-secret}' | base64 -d | openssl dgst -sha
  256 -r | awk '{print $1}')"
echo "Current client-secret SHA256: ${OLD_SECRET_SHA256}"
```

2

## Update the Client Secret

### DANGER

Do not modify the `client-id` value, and do not delete and recreate the Secret. Doing so may cause cascading authentication failures across the platform.

Use one of the following methods to update only the `client-secret` data field.

### Method 1: Using `kubectl patch` (recommended)

Read the new secret from secure interactive input:

```
read -rs NEW_CLIENT_SECRET
echo
kubectl patch secret cpaas-oidc-secret -n cpaas-system \
  --type merge \
  -p "{\"data\":{\"client-secret\": \"$(printf %s \"$NEW_CLIENT_SECRET\"
| base64 | tr -d '\\n')\"}}"
unset NEW_CLIENT_SECRET
```

## Method 2: Using `kubectl edit`

Open the Secret in your default editor and replace the `client-secret` value with the new base64-encoded value.

```
kubectl edit secret cpaas-oidc-secret -n cpaas-system
```

### TIP

You can generate the base64-encoded value in advance:

```
read -rs NEW_CLIENT_SECRET
echo
printf %s "$NEW_CLIENT_SECRET" | base64
unset NEW_CLIENT_SECRET
```

Verify that the Secret has been updated on the global cluster without exposing plaintext:

```
NEW_SECRET_SHA256="$(kubectl get secret cpaas-oidc-secret -n cpaas-system \
  -o jsonpath='{.data.client-secret}' | base64 -d | openssl dgst -sha
256 -r | awk '{print $1}')"
echo "Updated client-secret SHA256: ${NEW_SECRET_SHA256}"
test "${OLD_SECRET_SHA256}" != "${NEW_SECRET_SHA256}" && \
  echo "Verification passed: client-secret has changed."
unset OLD_SECRET_SHA256 NEW_SECRET_SHA256
```

After the Secret is updated, the `base-operator` automatically synchronizes it to all member clusters. Some components that depend on the OIDC credential will restart to load the new value. In particular, verify that the `frontend` and `apollo` deployments are running normally:

```
kubectl get deploy -n cpaas-system frontend apollo
```

Verify that all Pods are `READY` and `UP-TO-DATE`. It may take several minutes for the restart to complete.

### INFO

If a component fails to start, verify that the `cpaas-oidc-secret` Secret exists in the `cpaas-system` namespace and contains valid `client-id` and `client-secret` values.

## Rollback

If issues occur after the Secret change, restore the previous value from the backup created in [Step 1](#):

```
kubectl apply -f cpaas-oidc-secret-backup.yaml
```

Alternatively, if you know the previous secret value:

```
read -rs PREVIOUS_CLIENT_SECRET
echo
kubectl patch secret cpaas-oidc-secret -n cpaas-system \
  --type merge \
  -p "{\"data\":{\"client-secret\":\"$(printf %s \"$PREVIOUS_CLIENT_SECRET\" | base64 | tr -d '\\n')\"}}\"
unset PREVIOUS_CLIENT_SECRET
```

After rolling back, repeat the [verification steps](#) to confirm that all components are healthy.

# Disabling the PKCE Plain Method

Starting from ACP v4.3.0, PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) verification is enabled by default for login authorization. To maintain backward compatibility with affected plugins that use the `Agnostic` life cycle and are not yet upgraded, the platform retains the `plain` code challenge method alongside the secure `S256` method after upgrade.

Once all affected `Agnostic` plugins have been upgraded to versions compatible with ACP v4.3.0, you should remove the `plain` method to enforce `S256`-only PKCE verification.

## TOC

[Prerequisites](#)[Procedure](#)[Verification](#)[Rollback](#)

## Prerequisites

- `kubectl` access to the **global cluster** with cluster-admin privileges.
- All clusters managed by the platform have been upgraded to ACP v4.3.
- The following affected plugins with the `Agnostic` life cycle have been upgraded to versions compatible with ACP v4.3:

- Alauda Container Platform Gitops
- Alauda Build of Kiali
- Kubeflow Base
- Alauda AI

### WARNING

In this context, affected plugins are the listed `Agnostic` plugins that use the platform OIDC authorization flow; removing `plain` before all of them are upgraded to ACP v4.3-compatible versions will cause authentication failures.

## Procedure

The OIDC client configuration is stored as an `OAuth2Client` custom resource in the `cpaas-system` namespace. Determine the target resource name by client ID:

```
OIDC_CLIENT_NAME="$(kubectl get oauth2client -n cpaas-system \
  -o jsonpath='{range .items[?(@.id=="alauda-auth")]}{.metadata.name}
  {"\n"}{end}' | head -n 1)"
test -n "${OIDC_CLIENT_NAME}" || { echo "Failed to find OAuth2Client for
id=alauda-auth"; exit 1; }
echo "Target OAuth2Client: ${OIDC_CLIENT_NAME}"
```

Edit the `OAuth2Client` resource:

```
kubectl edit oauth2client "${OIDC_CLIENT_NAME}" -n cpaas-system
```

Locate the `codeChallengeMethods` field and remove the `plain` entry, keeping only `S256`:

```
# Before
codeChallengeMethods:
- S256
- plain

# After
codeChallengeMethods:
- S256
```

Save and exit the editor. The change takes effect immediately.

## Verification

Confirm that the `plain` method has been removed:

```
kubectl get oauth2client "${OIDC_CLIENT_NAME}" -n cpaas-system \
-o jsonpath='{.codeChallengeMethods}'
```

The output should be:

```
["S256"]
```

Run at least one login/authorization verification for each affected plugin ( `Alauda Container Platform Gitops` , `Alauda Build of Kiali` , `Kubeflow Base` , and `Alauda AI` ) to confirm there are no PKCE-related authentication failures.

## Rollback

If authentication issues occur after removing the `plain` method (for example, any affected plugin login or authorization fails), add it back:

```
kubectl patch oauth2client "${OIDC_CLIENT_NAME}" -n cpaas-system \
  --type merge \
  -p '{"codeChallengeMethods":["S256","plain"]}'
```

After rollback, verify affected plugin logins again and then `unset OIDC_CLIENT_NAME`.

# Users and Roles

## User

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- User Sources
- User Management Rules
- Role Assignment Views
- User Lifecycle

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## Group

### Introduction

- Group Introduction
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## Role

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## IDP

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## User Policy

### Introduction

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# User

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# Introduction

The platform supports user authentication and login verification for all users.

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## TOC

### User Sources

- Local Users

- Third-Party Users

  - LDAP Users

  - OIDC Users

  - Other Third-Party Users

- User Management Rules

- Role Assignment Views

- User Lifecycle

---

## User Sources

### Local Users

- Administrator account created during platform deployment
  - Accounts created through the platform interface
-

- Users added through local dex configuration file

## Third-Party Users

### LDAP Users

- Enterprise users synchronized from LDAP servers
- Accounts are imported through IDP (Identity Provider) integration
- Source is displayed as the IDP configuration name
- Integration is configured through IDP settings

### OIDC Users

- Third-party platform users authenticated via OIDC protocol
- Source is displayed as the IDP configuration name
- Integration is configured through IDP settings

#### WARNING

For OIDC users added to a project before their first login:

- Source is displayed as "-" until successful platform login
- After successful login, source changes to the IDP configuration name

### Other Third-Party Users

- Users authenticated through supported dex connectors (e.g., GitHub, Microsoft)
- For more information, refer to the [dex official documentation](#) ↗

## User Management Rules

#### WARNING

Please note the following important rules:

- Local usernames must be unique across all user types
- Third-party users (OIDC/LDAP) with matching usernames are automatically associated
- Associated users inherit permissions from existing accounts
- Users can log in through their respective sources
- Only one user record is displayed per username in the platform
- User source is determined by the most recent login method

## Role Assignment Views

Every user detail page now contains two dedicated tabs for role visibility and maintenance:

- **Platform Roles** (read-only): Lists system-provided platform/project/namespace roles that are bound to the user. These roles cannot be edited or duplicated in the UI but can be unbound if necessary.
- **Kubernetes Roles**: Displays all RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding objects that reference the user (across clusters). Administrators can create or remove bindings here to grant native Kubernetes permissions.

Use the Platform Roles tab for default access templates, and use the Kubernetes Roles tab when you need fine-grained control through native roles.

## User Lifecycle

The following table describes different user statuses on the platform:

Status	Description
Normal	User account is active and can log in to the platform
Disabled	User account is inactive and cannot log in. Contact platform administrator for activation.

<b>Status</b>	<b>Description</b>
	<p>Possible reasons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- No login for 90+ consecutive days</li><li>- Account expiration</li><li>- Manual disable by administrator</li></ul>
<b>Locked</b>	<p>Account is temporarily locked due to 5 failed login attempts within 24 hours.</p> <p>Details:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Lock duration: 20 minutes</li><li>- Can be manually unlocked by administrator</li><li>- Account becomes available after lock period</li></ul>
<b>Invalid</b>	<p>LDAP-synchronized account that has been deleted from the LDAP server.</p> <p>Note: Invalid accounts cannot log in to the platform</p>

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# Guides

---

## Manage User Roles

Assign Platform Roles (System Templates)

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# Manage User Roles

Platform administrators can manage roles for other users (not their own account) to grant or revoke permissions. After the RBAC refactor, role assignments are split into **Platform Roles** (system templates) and **Kubernetes Roles** (native RoleBinding objects).

## TOC

### [Assign Platform Roles \(System Templates\)](#)

- Steps

- Remove Platform Roles

### [Bind Kubernetes Roles \(RoleBinding / ClusterRoleBinding\)](#)

- Steps

- Remove Kubernetes RoleBindings

## Assign Platform Roles (System Templates)

Use this tab to bind or unbind the predefined platform/project/namespace roles that the product ships with.

### Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > User Management**.

2. Click the username of the target user.
3. Open the **Platform Roles** tab.
4. Click **Add Role**.
5. In the dialog:
  - Select a role from the **Role Name** dropdown.
  - Choose the scope (Cluster / Project / Namespace) if prompted.
  - Click **Add**.

#### NOTE

Notes for platform roles:

- Only the predefined system roles are available here; they cannot be edited or duplicated.
- A role can only be bound once per scope. Already-bound roles are disabled in the dropdown.
- The built-in Cluster Administrator role cannot be reassigned for the global cluster.

## Remove Platform Roles

1. Stay on the **Platform Roles** tab.
2. Click **Remove** next to the role you want to unbind.
3. Confirm the removal.

## Bind Kubernetes Roles (RoleBinding / ClusterRoleBinding)

Use this tab to grant fine-grained permissions through native Kubernetes roles that exist inside specific clusters.

### Steps

1. On the user detail page, switch to the **Kubernetes Roles** tab.

2. Click **Add RoleBinding**.

3. Configure the binding:

- **Cluster:** Target cluster that hosts the role.
- **Binding Type:** `RoleBinding` (namespace scope) or `ClusterRoleBinding`.
- **Namespace:** Required when `RoleBinding` is selected.
- **Role Name:** Choose an existing `Role` or `ClusterRole`.
- **Subject:** Confirm the current user as the binding subject.

4. Click **Create**.

## Remove Kubernetes RoleBindings

1. Remain on the **Kubernetes Roles** tab.

2. Locate the binding (filter by cluster, namespace, or role if needed).

3. Click **Remove** and confirm.

### WARNING

Role management permissions:

- Only platform administrators can manage other users' roles.
- Users cannot modify roles or bindings for their own account.

# Create User

Users with platform administrator roles can create local users and assign roles to them through the platform interface.

## TOC

[Create User via Console](#)

[Create User via YAML](#)

## Create User via Console

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > User Management**
2. Click **Create User**
3. Configure the following parameters:

Parameter	Description
<b>Password Type</b>	Select a password generation method: <b>Random:</b> System generates a secure random password <b>Custom:</b> User manually enters a password
<b>Password</b>	Enter or generate a password based on the selected type.

Parameter	Description
	<p>Password Requirements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Length: 8-32 characters</li> <li>- Must contain letters and numbers</li> <li>- Must contain special characters ( <code>~!@#\$\$%^&amp;* ( ) - _ = + ?</code> )</li> </ul> <p>Password Field Features:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Click the eye icon to show/hide password</li> <li>- Click the copy icon to copy password</li> </ul>
<b>Mailbox</b>	<p>User's email address:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Must be unique</li> <li>- Can be used as login username</li> <li>- Associated with user's name</li> </ul>
<b>Validity Period</b>	<p>Set the user's account validity period:</p> <p>Options:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Permanent:</b> No time limit</li> <li>- <b>Custom:</b> Set start and end times using the Time Range dropdown</li> </ul>
<b>Roles</b>	Assign one or more roles to the user
<b>Continue Creating</b>	<p>Toggle switch to control post-creation behavior:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>On:</b> Redirects to new user creation page</li> <li>- <b>Off:</b> Shows user details page</li> </ul>

#### 4. Click **Create**

##### NOTE

After successful user creation:

- If "Continue Creating" is enabled, you'll be redirected to create another user
- If disabled, you'll see the created user's details page

## Create User via YAML

You can submit the following YAML in the `global` cluster to create a user.

```
apiVersion: auth.alauda.io/v1
kind: User
metadata:
  labels:
    auth.cpaas.io/user.connector_id: "" # Connector ID
for external authentication (leave empty for local users)
    auth.cpaas.io/user.connector_type: "" # Connector t
ype for external authentication (leave empty for local users)
    auth.cpaas.io/user.email: c18c9911faaac4e1051a599b88c62af2 # MD5 has
h of the username (spec.email)
    auth.cpaas.io/user.state: active # User state;
must match spec.state
    auth.cpaas.io/user.username: "" # User displa
y name; must match spec.username
    auth.cpaas.io/user.valid: "true" # Whether the
user is valid; must match spec.valid
  name: c18c9911faaac4e1051a599b88c62af2 # Name of the
User resource; MD5 hash of spec.email
spec:
  connector_name: "" # Name of the
external authentication connector (leave empty for local users)
  connector_type: "" # Type of the
external authentication connector (leave empty for local users)
  email: leizhuaaa # User identi
fier; can be an email address or any unique string
  is_admin: false # Whether the
user is an initial admin user; must be set to false
  state: active # User accoun
t state: active or inactive
  username: "" # Display nam
e for the user
  valid: true # Whether the
user account is valid; should be set to true
```

# User Management

The platform provides flexible user management capabilities, supporting both individual user management and batch operations for improved efficiency in specific scenarios (e.g., on-site or off-site teams).

## WARNING

Important Restrictions:

- System-generated accounts cannot be managed (platform administrator role, local source)
- Currently logged-in users cannot manage their own accounts
- For personal account modifications (display name, password), please use the personal information page

## TOC

### [Reset Local User Password](#)

Steps

### [Update User Expiry Date](#)

Steps

### [Activate User](#)

Steps

### [Disable User](#)

Steps

Add User to Local User Group

Steps

View User Roles

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Batch Operations

Steps

---

## Reset Local User Password

Users with platform management permissions can reset passwords for other local users.

### Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > User Management**
2. Click the icon next to the target user's record
3. Click **Reset Password**
4. In the dialog box, select a password type:
  - **Random**: System generates a secure random password
  - **Custom**: Enter a new password manually

#### NOTE

Password Requirements:

- Length: 8-32 characters
- Must contain letters and numbers
- Must contain special characters ( `~!@#$$%^&* ( ) - _ = + ?` )

Password Field Features:

- Click eye icon to show/hide password

- Click copy icon to copy password

5. Click **Reset**

## Update User Expiry Date

You can update expiry dates for users in **normal**, **disabled**, or **locked** status. Users exceeding their expiry date will be automatically disabled.

### Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > User Management**
2. Click **Update Expiry Date** next to the target user
3. In the dialog box, select an expiry date option:
  - **Permanent**: No time limit
  - **Custom**: Set start and end times using the Time Range dropdown
4. Click **Update**

## Activate User

You can activate users in **disabled** or **locked** status.

### NOTE

Activation Behavior:

- If user is within expiry date: expiry date remains unchanged
- If user has expired: expiry date becomes **Permanent**

### Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > User Management**
2. Click **Activate** next to the target user
3. Click **Activate** in the confirmation dialog
4. User status will change to **normal**

## Disable User

You can disable users in **normal** or **locked** status within their expiry date. Disabled users cannot log in but can be reactivated.

### Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > User Management**
2. Click the icon next to the target user
3. Click **Disable** and confirm

## Add User to Local User Group

You can add users with **Source** as **Local** or **LDAP** to one or more local user groups.

### WARNING

Group Role Behavior:

- Users automatically inherit roles from their groups
- Group roles are only visible on the group's details page (**Platform Roles** tab)
- Individual user role lists only show directly assigned roles

### Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > User Management**

2. Click the icon next to the target user
3. Click **Add to User Group**
4. Select one or more local user groups
5. Click **Add**

## View User Roles


After the RBAC refactor, each user detail page shows two tabs:

- **Platform Roles:** Displays the system-provided roles bound to the user. You can add or remove bindings but cannot edit role definitions.
- **Kubernetes Roles:** Lists every RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding that references the user across clusters. You can create or remove bindings directly on this tab.

See [Manage User Roles](#) for detailed procedures.

## Delete User

Platform administrators can delete any user except the currently logged-in account, including:

- IDP-configured users
- Users with source 
- Local users

## Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > User Management**
2. Click the icon next to the target user
3. Click **Delete**
4. Click **Confirm**

# Batch Operations

You can perform batch operations for:

- Updating validity periods
- Activating users
- Disabling users
- Deleting users

## Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > User Management**
2. Select one or more users using checkboxes
3. Click **Batch Operations** and select an action:
  - **Update Validity**
  - **Activate**
  - **Deactivate**
  - **Delete**

### NOTE

Batch Operation Details:

- **Update Validity:** Set permanent or custom time range
- **Activate:** Confirm activation in dialog
- **Deactivate:** Confirm deactivation in dialog
- **Delete:** Enter current account password and confirm

# Group

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### Manage Local User Group

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### [Group Introduction](#)

#### Group Types

##### Local User Group

##### IDP-Synchronized User Group

---

## Group Introduction

The platform supports user management through user groups. By managing group roles, you can efficiently:

- Grant platform operation permissions to multiple users simultaneously
- Revoke permissions from multiple users at once
- Implement batch role-based access control

For example, when personnel changes occur within an enterprise and you need to grant new project or namespace operation permissions to multiple users, you can:

1. Create a user group
  2. Import relevant users as group members
  3. Configure project and namespace roles for the group
-

#### 4. Apply unified permissions to all group members

## Group Types

The platform supports two types of groups:

### Local User Group

- Created directly on the platform
- Source is displayed as **Local**
- Can be updated or deleted
- Supports:
  - Adding or removing users from any source
  - Adding or removing roles

### IDP-Synchronized User Group

- Synchronized from connected IDP (LDAP, Azure AD)
- Source is displayed as the connected **IDP** name
- Cannot be updated or deleted
- Supports:
  - Adding or removing roles
  - Cannot manage group members (add or remove)

# Guides

## Manage User Group Roles

Add Role to Group

Remove Role from Group

## Create Local User Group

Create User Group

Manage User Groups

## Manage Local User Group

Prerequisites

Import Member

Remove Member

# Manage User Group Roles

Users with platform management permissions can manage roles for both local user groups and IDP-synchronized user groups.

## TOC

### Add Role to Group

Steps

### Remove Role from Group

Steps

## Add Role to Group

### Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > User Group Management**
2. Click the name of the target user group
3. On the **Configure Role** tab, click **Add Role**
4. Click to add a role

#### NOTE

**Role Assignment Rules:**

- You can add multiple roles to a group
- Each role can only be added once to the same group

5. Select the role name from the dropdown
6. Choose the role's permission scope (cluster, project, or namespace)
7. Click **Add**

## Remove Role from Group

**WARNING**

When you remove a role from a group:

- All permissions granted by that role to group members will be revoked
- This action cannot be undone

## Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > User Group Management**
2. Click the name of the target user group
3. On the **Configure Role** tab, click **Remove** next to the role
4. Click **Confirm** to remove the role

# Create Local User Group

Local user groups allow you to implement role-based access control for multiple users from any source.

## TOC

[Create User Group](#)

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## Create User Group

### Steps

1. In the left sidebar, click **Users > User Group Management**
2. Click **Create User Group**
3. Enter the following information:
  - **Name:** The name of the user group
  - **Description:** A description of the group's purpose
4. Click **Create**

# Manage User Groups

You can manage user groups by clicking the icon on the list page or clicking **Operations** in the upper right corner on the details page.

Operation	Description
<b>Update User Group</b>	Update group information based on the group source: - For groups with <b>Source</b> as <code>Local</code> : Can update both name and description - For groups with <b>Source</b> as <code>IDP name</code> : Can only update description
<b>Delete Local User Group</b>	Delete user groups with <b>Source</b> as <code>Local</code>

## WARNING

When you delete a group:

- All group members will be removed
- All roles assigned to the group will be removed
- This action cannot be undone

# Manage Local User Group Membership

Only users with Platform Management permissions can manage local user group memberships.

## TOC

### Prerequisites

#### Import Members

##### Steps

#### Remove Members

##### Steps

## Prerequisites

### WARNING

Before managing group memberships, please note the following limitations:

- Only users with Platform Management permissions can manage groups and their members
- System accounts and currently logged-in accounts cannot be managed (imported to or removed from groups)
- Each local user group can have a maximum of 5000 members

- When a group reaches the 5000-member limit, no further imports are allowed

## Import Members

You can import users from the platform into local user groups for unified permission management.

### TIP

Users imported into a group will automatically inherit all operational permissions assigned to that group.

## Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > User Group Management**
2. Click the name of the local user group where you want to add members
3. On the **Group Member Management** tab, click **Import Member**
4. Select one or more users from the platform by checking the boxes next to their usernames/display names
5. Click **Import**

### NOTE

- You can only select users who are not currently members of the group
- Use the **Import All** button to import all users in the list at once

## Remove Members

When you remove a user from a group, all operational permissions granted to that user through the group will be automatically revoked.

## Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > User Group Management**
2. Click the name of the local user group where you want to remove members
3. On the **Group Member Management** tab, you can remove members in two ways:
  - Click **Remove** next to the member's name and confirm
  - Select one or more members using checkboxes, then click **Batch Remove** and confirm

# Role

## Introduction

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# Introduction

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## Role Introduction

The platform's user role management is implemented on top of Kubernetes RBAC (Role-Based Access Control). After ACP 4.2, the model is split into two complementary layers:

- **Platform Roles:** System-provided templates that guarantee core product scenarios. They are read-only in the UI; you can only bind or unbind them for users and groups.
- **Kubernetes Roles:** Native Kubernetes `Role` and `ClusterRole` objects that you can create per cluster to satisfy bespoke permission requirements. These roles are managed from the **Kubernetes Roles** page and bound through RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding.

Both layers ultimately translate into Kubernetes permissions. Assigning or removing a role immediately grants or revokes the associated operations (create, view, update, delete, etc.) on targeted resources.

---

# System Roles

To meet common permission configuration scenarios, the platform provides the following default system roles. These roles enable flexible access control for platform resources and efficient permission management for users.

Role Name	Description	Role Level
<b>Platform Administrator</b>	Has full access to all business and resources on the platform	Platform
<b>Platform Auditors</b>	Can view all platform resources and operation records, but has no other permissions	Platform
<b>Cluster Administrator (Alpha)</b>	Manages and maintains cluster resources with full access to all cluster-level resources	Cluster
<b>Project Administrator</b>	Manages namespace administrators and namespace quotas	Project
<b>namespace-admin-system</b>	Manages namespace members and role assignments	Namespace
<b>Developers</b>	Develops, deploys, and maintains custom applications within namespaces	Namespace

## Custom Permissions

The legacy “checkbox-based” custom role creation experience has been removed. To implement new authorization scenarios you must:

1. Use the **Kubernetes Roles** page to create native roles (Role/ClusterRole) in the desired cluster, or
2. Request role templates from the owning plug-in team and bind them through RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding.

**WARNING**

Deleting or editing a native role affects every RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding that references it.  
Review existing bindings and validate changes in a staging environment when possible.

# Guides

## Create Kubernetes Roles

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## Manage Roles

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# Create Kubernetes Roles

Starting from ACP 4.2, custom permissions are delivered through native Kubernetes roles. Use the **Kubernetes Roles** page (located under **Users > Platform Roles > Kubernetes Roles**) to create or manage `Role` and `ClusterRole` objects in the currently selected cluster.

## TOC

### Prerequisites

Create a Role or ClusterRole

Edit Role YAML (Optional)

Create RoleBindings

Verify

## Prerequisites

- You are assigned a platform role that grants access to the Kubernetes Roles feature.
- You have selected the target cluster in the global cluster switcher.
- The cluster already contains any namespaces that your role will scope to.

## Create a Role or ClusterRole

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > Platform Roles > Kubernetes Roles**.
2. Click **Create Role**.
3. In the drawer:
  - Enter the **Name** (must satisfy Kubernetes naming rules).
  - Choose the **Type** ( `Role` or `ClusterRole` ).
  - If you selected `Role` , pick the **Namespace** that scopes the permissions.
4. Configure rules by adding one or more entries with:
  - **API Groups**
  - **Resources**
  - **Resource Names** (optional)
  - **Verbs** ( `get` , `list` , `watch` , `create` , `update` , `patch` , `delete` )
5. Click **Create**.

The role is created directly inside the cluster and becomes available for RoleBinding operations immediately.

## Edit Role YAML (Optional)

1. Open the **Kubernetes Roles** tab and click the role name.
2. On the **YAML** tab, click **Edit**.
3. Update fields such as labels, annotations, or rules.
4. Click **Save** to apply the changes.

## Create RoleBindings

To grant the newly created role to users or groups:

1. While viewing a role, switch to the **RoleBindings** tab.
2. Click **Create RoleBindings**.

3. Provide:

- **Name**
- **Binding Type** ( `RoleBinding` or `ClusterRoleBinding` — only `RoleBinding` is available when the source is a namespace-scoped role)
- **Namespace** (for `RoleBinding` )
- **Subjects** (User, Group, or ServiceAccount with the corresponding name)

4. Click **Create**.

Alternatively, open the **Users** or **User Groups** page, switch to the **Kubernetes Roles** tab, and create bindings directly from the user perspective.

## Verify

Use one of the following methods to confirm the role exists:

```
kubectl get role <role-name> -n <namespace>
kubectl get clusterrole <clusterrole-name>
```

Or refresh the **Kubernetes Roles** list and use the built-in search (by name or label) to locate the role.

# Manage Roles

---

## TOC

### [View Platform Roles \(Read-Only\)](#)

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Grant a Platform Role to Users via YAML

View and Update a Kubernetes Role via YAML

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## View Platform Roles (Read-Only)

Platform roles remain the canonical templates for core functionality.

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > Platform Roles**.
  2. Use the list filters to locate a role. The **Role Type** column now shows `Platform`, `Project`, `Namespace`, or `Cluster`.
  3. Click the role name to open the detail page.
-

4. Switch to the **YAML** tab to inspect the exact definition. Use **Download YAML** if you need to archive the spec.

## Grant a Platform Role to Users via Console

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > Platform Roles**.
2. Click the role name to open the detail page.
3. Switch to the **Members** tab.
4. Click **Import Members**.
5. You can select users from the platform and import them to the role as members.

## Grant a Platform Role to Users via YAML

You can submit the following YAML in the `global` cluster to grant a specific platform role to a user.

```
apiVersion: auth.alauda.io/v1 kind: UserBinding metadata: annotations:
auth.cpaas.io/role.display-name: Platform Admin # Display name of the role to be assigned
auth.cpaas.io/user.email: bxliu@alauda.io # Username of the user to grant the role to labels:
auth.cpaas.io/role.display-name: "" # Display name of the role to be assigned
auth.cpaas.io/role.level: platform # Scope of the role: platform, project, namespace, or cluster
auth.cpaas.io/role.name: acp-platform-admin # Name of the role to be assigned
auth.cpaas.io/user.email: 569526aac97a17ce8c1c185d7544aae4 # MD5 hash of the
Username cpaas.io/cluster: "" # Name of the cluster; required when role level is namespace or
cluster, leave empty for platform or project cpaas.io/namespace: "" # Name of the namespace;
required when role level is namespace, leave empty for platform, project, or cluster
cpaas.io/project: "" # Name of the project; required when role level is project or namespace,
leave empty for platform or cluster name: dc30204c17c7fe8b15383f4ed7798c88 # Name of
the UserBinding resource; can be customized
```

## View and Update a Kubernetes Role via YAML

1. Navigate to **Users > Platform Roles > Kubernetes Roles**.
2. Search by name or label.
3. Click the role name, then open the **YAML** tab.
4. Click **Edit**, modify the manifest (labels, annotations, or `rules`), and click **Save**.
5. Review the **RoleBindings** tab to ensure existing bindings still meet your expectations.

## Delete a Kubernetes Role

1. On the **Kubernetes Roles** list, click the overflow menu (...) next to the role.
2. Select **Delete Role**.
3. Confirm the role name to proceed.

Deleting a role removes it from the cluster. You must also clean up any RoleBindings that referenced the role. The UI will show a warning if bindings are still present.

## Manage RoleBindings

### From the Role Perspective

1. Open a role (Role or ClusterRole) from the **Kubernetes Roles** tab.
2. Go to the **RoleBindings** tab.
3. Use the search bar (supports name and label filters) to locate existing bindings.
4. Actions:
  - **Create RoleBindings**: Launches the creation wizard.
  - **Update Role**: Opens the YAML editor for the role itself.
  - **Delete Binding**: Removes the RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding after confirmation.

### From Users or User Groups

1. Open **Users** (or **User Groups**) and select the desired entry.

2. Switch to the **Kubernetes Roles** tab.
3. Review all RoleBindings associated with the user/group across clusters.
4. Click **Add RoleBinding**, choose:
  - Cluster
  - Binding type (RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding)
  - Role/ClusterRole
  - Namespace (for RoleBinding)
  - Subject details
5. Save the binding.

This workflow complements the existing **Platform Roles** tab, which is still used to attach system roles to users.

## Best Practices

- Use staging clusters to validate YAML changes before applying them to production.
- Keep role definitions under version control (for example, export them into Git) so that changes remain auditable.
- When in doubt about required permissions, start from a system role's YAML, copy it locally, and adapt it as a Kubernetes role through the new UI.

# How to Create Custom Platform Role

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  - 6.1 Trim a system RoleTemplate YAML
  - 6.2 Trim namespace-developer-system into an auditor role

## 1. Overview

This document explains the core concepts of custom roles and how to configure a RoleTemplate.

## 2. Core Concepts

- **RoleTemplate**: Custom role template. It defines role semantics and permission sets, and is converted by the controller into ClusterRoles.
- **FunctionResource**: An abstraction of K8s resources used by product features; referenced by `functionResourceRef` in RoleTemplate.
- **ClusterRole**: RBAC rule set; can be aggregated into system roles via labels.
- **UserBinding**: Binding between users and roles/scopes; the controller generates RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding based on UserBinding for final authorization.

### NOTE

- The value of `functionResourceRef` comes from FunctionResource `metadata.name`.
- Display names are typically in `metadata.annotations`, which you can use to map to UI modules.

## 3. Technical Changes

Starting from ACP v4.3, feature permissions are gradually migrated from FunctionResource to native K8s ClusterRole management. RoleTemplate module permissions will be aggregated into system roles via ClusterRole labels. FunctionResource-based management will be retired in v4.5.

## 4. Supported Configuration Methods

- **FunctionResource method**: Select permissions by product modules and control verbs at fine granularity.
- **ClusterRole aggregation method (aggregationRules)**: Centralized aggregation via ClusterRole labels; recommended for v4.2+.
- **customRules**: Configure permissions using native K8s RBAC syntax; same rule format as ClusterRole `rules`.

## 5. Configuration

### 5.1 RoleTemplate YAML

#### FunctionResource method (supported until v4.5)

```
apiVersion: auth.alauda.io/v1beta1
kind: RoleTemplate
metadata:
  name: demo-funcrole
  annotations:
    cpaas.io/display-name: Example Function Role
    cpaas.io/description: FunctionResource example
  labels:
    auth.cpaas.io/roletemplate.level: namespace
spec:
  rules:
    - functionResourceRef: acp-app
      verbs: [get, list, watch]
```

FunctionResource example:

```

apiVersion: auth.alauda.io/v1beta1
kind: FunctionResource
metadata:
  name: acp-app
  annotations:
    cpaas.io/functionresource.module.display-name: Container Platform
    cpaas.io/functionresource.function.display-name: Application
  labels:
    auth.cpaas.io/functionresource.module: acp
    auth.cpaas.io/functionresource.function: app
    auth.cpaas.io/product: console-acp
spec:
  rules:
    - apiGroup: app.k8s.io
      resources: ["*"]
      bindScope: namespace
      bindCluster: unlimit
      bindNamespacePart: common

```

## ClusterRole aggregation method (v4.2+)

```

apiVersion: auth.alauda.io/v1beta1
kind: RoleTemplate
metadata:
  name: demo-aggrole
  annotations:
    cpaas.io/display-name: Example Aggregation Role
    cpaas.io/description: ClusterRole aggregation example
  labels:
    auth.cpaas.io/roletemplate.level: namespace
spec:
  aggregationRules:
    - clusterRoleSelectors:
        - matchLabels:
            rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-namespace-developer: "true"
            rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-scope-business-ns: "true"
      scope: business-ns
  rules: []

```

ClusterRole with aggregation labels:

```

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
  name: cpaas:demo:business-ns:view
  labels:
    rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-namespace-developer: "true"
    rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-scope-business-ns: "true"
rules:
- apiGroups: ["apps"]
  resources: ["deployments"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]

```

## customRules method

```

apiVersion: auth.alauda.io/v1beta1
kind: RoleTemplate
metadata:
  name: demo-customrules
  annotations:
    cpaas.io/display-name: Example Custom Rules Role
    cpaas.io/description: customRules example
  labels:
    auth.cpaas.io/roletemplate.level: namespace
spec:
  customRules:
- apiGroups: [""]
  resources: ["configmaps"]
  verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]

```

RoleTemplate field reference (with ranges):

Field	Description
<code>metadata.name</code>	Role name
<code>metadata.labels.auth.cpaas.io/roletemplate.level</code>	Role level

Field	Description
<code>metadata.annotations.cpaas.io/(display-name/description)</code>	Display name and description
<code>spec.rules[].functionResourceRef</code>	FunctionResource reference
<code>spec.rules[].verbs</code>	Verbs
<code>spec.aggregationRules[].scope</code>	Aggregation scope
<code>spec.aggregationRules[].clusterRoleSelectors</code>	Label selectors
<code>spec.aggregationRules[].clusterRoleSelectors.matchLabels</code>	Label key/value
<code>spec.aggregationRules[].clusterRoleSelectors.matchExpressions</code>	Expressions
<code>spec.customRules[].apiGroups</code>	API groups
<code>spec.customRules[].resources</code>	Resources
<code>spec.customRules[].verbs</code>	Verbs
<code>spec.customRules[].resourceNames</code>	Resource names

Field	Description
<code>spec.customRules[].nonResourceURLs</code>	Non-resource URLs

**NOTE**

`spec.rules` and `spec.aggregationRules` are mutually exclusive.

**System labels for matchLabels**

System role aggregation labels:

- `rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-platform-admin: "true"`
- `rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-platform-auditor: "true"`
- `rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-cluster-admin: "true"`
- `rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-project-admin: "true"`
- `rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-namespace-admin: "true"`
- `rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-namespace-developer: "true"`
- `rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-basic-user: "true"`

Scope aggregation labels:

- `rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-scope-cluster: "true"`
- `rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-scope-project-ns: "true"`
- `rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-scope-business-ns: "true"`
- `rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-scope-system-ns: "true"`
- `rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-scope-kube-public: "true"`

**NOTE**

Custom labels are also supported for aggregation.

FunctionResource field reference:

Field	Description
<code>metadata.name</code>	FunctionResource identifier (for <code>functionResourceRef</code> )
<code>metadata.annotations</code>	Display names (for UI mapping)
<code>metadata.labels</code>	Module/function metadata (for indexing)
<code>spec.rules[].apiGroup</code>	API group ( <code>""</code> for core)
<code>spec.rules[].resources</code>	Resource types
<code>spec.rules[].bindScope</code>	Scope ( <code>cluster</code> / <code>namespace</code> )
<code>spec.rules[].bindCluster</code>	Cluster scope ( <code>global</code> / <code>unlimit</code> / <code>business</code> )
<code>spec.rules[].bindNamespacePart</code>	Namespace part ( <code>common</code> / <code>system</code> / <code>kube-public</code> / <code>project_ns</code> / <code>cluster</code> / <code>""</code> )

#### NOTE

`acp-namespace-resource-manage` is **not allowed** in custom roles.

## 5.2 Get ClusterRoles generated from a RoleTemplate

Query ClusterRoles generated by a RoleTemplate using labels:

```
kubectl get clusterrole -l auth.cpaas.io/role.relative=<roletemplate-name>
```

## 6. Copy & Trim (Examples)

For custom roles, it is recommended to copy a built-in system template and trim it to avoid missing module permissions.

## 6.1 Trim a system RoleTemplate YAML

Steps:


- Keep the required FunctionResources.
- Reduce verbs to read-only (get/list/watch).
- Remove unused modules.

Role example: developer auditor without secret permissions

### NOTE

- In custom roles, do not configure Namespace Resource Management (FunctionResource: `acp-namespace-resource-manage` ).
- Remove User Secret Dictionary (FunctionResource: `acp-user-secret` ).
- Set all verbs to get/list/watch.

Example YAML:



```
apiVersion: auth.alauda.io/v1beta1
kind: RoleTemplate
metadata:
  annotations:
    cpaas.io/description: Responsible for development, deployment, and ma
intenance within the namespace.
    cpaas.io/display-name: Developer Copy
  labels:
    auth.cpaas.io/roletemplate.level: namespace
  name: namespace-developer-system-copy
spec:
  rules:
    - functionResourceRef: views-acp-userview
      verbs:
        - get
        - list
        - watch
    - functionResourceRef: infrastructure-clusters
      verbs:
        - get
        - list
        - watch
    - functionResourceRef: infrastructure-nodesmanage
      verbs:
        - get
        - list
        - watch
    - functionResourceRef: infrastructure-domains
      verbs:
        - get
        - list
        - watch
    - functionResourceRef: acp-subnet
      verbs:
        - get
        - list
        - watch
    - functionResourceRef: acp-networkpolicies
      verbs:
        - get
        - list
        - watch
    - functionResourceRef: infrastructure-storageclasses
```

```

verbs:
  - get
  - list
  - watch
- functionResourceRef: infrastructure-persistentvolumes
verbs:
  - get
  - list
  - watch
- functionResourceRef: acp-virtualmachineimagetemplates
verbs:
  - get
  - list
  - watch

```

## 6.2 Trim namespace-developer-system into an auditor role

Approach:

- Keep the scope structure (cluster / project-ns / business-ns / system-ns / kube-public).
- Replace aggregation labels with auditor labels (requires labeled ClusterRoles).

Example (excerpt):

```

apiVersion: auth.alauda.io/v1beta1
kind: RoleTemplate
metadata:
  name: namespace-auditor
  annotations:
    cpaas.io/display-name: Namespace Auditor
    cpaas.io/description: Read-only audit
  labels:
    auth.cpaas.io/roletemplate.level: namespace
spec:
  aggregationRules:
    - clusterRoleSelectors:
      - matchLabels:
          rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-namespace-auditor: "true"
          rbac.cpaas.io/aggregate-to-scope-business-ns: "true"
      scope: business-ns
  rules: []

```

## NOTE

`aggregate-to-namespace-auditor` must match labels on existing ClusterRoles. If not, create a read-only ClusterRole and add the label first.

# IDP

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# Troubleshooting

## Delete User

Problem Description

Solution

# Introduction

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### Overview

Supported Integration Methods

LDAP Integration

OIDC Integration

---

## Overview

The platform integrates with Dex identity authentication service, enabling you to use Dex's pre-implemented connectors for platform account authentication through IDP configuration. For more information, refer to the [Dex official documentation](#) ↗.

## Supported Integration Methods

### LDAP Integration

If your enterprise uses **LDAP** (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) for user management, you can configure LDAP on the platform to connect with your enterprise's LDAP server.

LDAP Integration Benefits:

---

- Enables communication between platform and LDAP server
- Allows enterprise users to log in with LDAP credentials
- Automatically synchronizes enterprise user accounts to the platform

## OIDC Integration

The platform supports integration with IDP services using the OpenID Connect (OIDC) protocol for third-party user authentication.

OIDC Integration Benefits:

- Enables users to log in with third-party accounts
- Supports enterprise IDP services
- Provides secure authentication through OIDC protocol

### NOTE

For authentication using other connectors not mentioned above, please contact technical support.

# Guides

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## OIDC Management

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# LDAP Management

Platform administrators can add, update, and delete LDAP services on the platform.

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#### LDAP Terminology

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---

## LDAP Overview

LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) is a mature, flexible, and well-supported standard mechanism for interacting with directory servers. It organizes data in a hierarchical tree structure to store enterprise user and organization information, primarily used for implementing single sign-on (SSO).

### NOTE

LDAP Key Features:

- Enables communication between clients and LDAP servers
- Supports data storage, retrieval, and search operations
- Provides client authentication capabilities
- Facilitates integration with other systems

For more information, refer to the [LDAP official documentation](#).

## Supported LDAP Types

### OpenLDAP

OpenLDAP is an open-source implementation of LDAP. If your organization uses open-source LDAP for user authentication, you can configure the platform to communicate with the LDAP service by adding LDAP and configuring relevant parameters.

### NOTE

**OpenLDAP Integration:**

- Enables platform authentication for LDAP users
- Supports standard LDAP protocols
- Provides flexible user management

For more information about OpenLDAP, refer to the [OpenLDAP official documentation](#) ↗.

## Active Directory

Active Directory is Microsoft's LDAP-based software for providing directory storage services in Windows systems. If your organization uses Microsoft Active Directory for user management, you can configure the platform to communicate with the Active Directory service.

### NOTE

**Active Directory Integration:**

- Enables platform authentication for AD users
- Supports Windows domain integration
- Provides enterprise-level user management

## LDAP Terminology

### OpenLDAP Common Terms

Term	Description	Example
<b>dc (Domain Component)</b>	Domain component	<code>dc=example, dc=com</code>
<b>ou (Organizational Unit)</b>	Organizational unit	<code>ou=People, dc=example, dc=com</code>

Term	Description	Example
<b>cn (Common Name)</b>	Common name	<code>cn=admin, dc=example, dc=com</code>
<b>uid (User ID)</b>	User ID	<code>uid=example</code>
<b>objectClass (Object Class)</b>	Object class	<code>objectClass=inetOrgPerson</code>
<b>mail (Mail)</b>	Mail	<code>mail=example@126.com</code>
<b>givenName (Given Name)</b>	Given name	<code>givenName=xq</code>
<b>sn (Surname)</b>	Surname	<code>sn=ren</code>
<b>objectClass: groupOfNames</b>	User group	<code>objectClass: groupOfNames</code>
<b>member (Member)</b>	Group member attribute	<code>member=cn=admin, dc=example, dc=com</code>
<b>memberOf</b>	User group membership attribute	<code>memberOf=cn=users, dc=example, dc=com</code>

## Active Directory Common Terms

Term	Description	Example
<b>dc (Domain Component)</b>	Domain component	<code>dc=example, dc=com</code>
<b>ou (Organizational Unit)</b>	Organizational unit	<code>ou=People, dc=example, dc=com</code>
<b>cn (Common Name)</b>	Common name	<code>cn=admin, dc=example, dc=com</code>

Term	Description	Example
<b>sAMAccountName/userPrincipalName</b>	User identifier	<code>userPrincipalName=example</code> or <code>sAMAccountName=example</code>
<b>objectClass: user</b>	AD user object class	<code>objectClass=user</code>
<b>mail (Mail)</b>	Mail	<code>mail=example@126.com</code>
<b>displayName</b>	Display name	<code>displayName=example</code>
<b>givenName (Given Name)</b>	Given name	<code>givenName=xq</code>
<b>sn (Surname)</b>	Surname	<code>sn=ren</code>
<b>objectClass: group</b>	User group	<code>objectClass: group</code>
<b>member (Member)</b>	Group member attribute	<code>member=CN=Admin, DC=example, DC:</code>
<b>memberOf</b>	User group membership attribute	<code>memberOf=CN=Users, DC=example, DC:</code>

## Add LDAP

### TIP

After successful LDAP integration:

- Users can log in to the platform using their enterprise accounts
- Multiple additions of the same LDAP will overwrite previously synchronized users

## Prerequisites

Before adding LDAP, prepare the following information:

- LDAP server address
- Administrator username
- Administrator password
- Other required configuration details

## Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > IDPs**
2. Click **Add LDAP**
3. Configure the following parameters:

## Basic Information

Parameter	Description
Server Address	LDAP server access address (e.g., <code>192.168.156.141:31758</code> )
Username	LDAP administrator DN (e.g., <code>cn=admin,dc=example,dc=com</code> )
Password	LDAP administrator account password
Login Box Username Prompt	Prompt message for username input (e.g., "Please enter your username")

## Search Settings

### NOTE

Search Settings Purpose:

- Matches LDAP user entries based on specified conditions
- Extracts key user and group attributes
- Maps LDAP attributes to platform user attributes

Parameter	Description
<b>Object Type</b>	ObjectClass for users: - OpenLDAP: <code>inetOrgPerson</code> - Active Directory: <code>organizationalPerson</code> - Groups: <code>posixGroup</code>
<b>Login Field</b>	Attribute used as login username: - OpenLDAP: <code>mail</code> (email address) - Active Directory: <code>userPrincipalName</code>
<b>Filter Conditions</b>	LDAP filter conditions for user/group filtering Example: <code>(&amp;(cn=John*)(givenName=*xq*))</code>
<b>Search Starting Point</b>	Base DN for user/group search (e.g., <code>dc=example,dc=org</code> )
<b>Search Scope</b>	Search scope: - <code>sub</code> : entire directory subtree - <code>one</code> : one level below starting point
<b>Login Attribute</b>	Unique user identifier: - OpenLDAP: <code>uid</code> - Active Directory: <code>distinguishedName</code>
<b>Name Attribute</b>	Object name attribute (default: <code>cn</code> )
<b>Email Attribute</b>	Email attribute: - OpenLDAP: <code>mail</code> - Active Directory: <code>userPrincipalName</code>
<b>Group Member Attribute</b>	Group member identifier (default: <code>uid</code> )
<b>Group Attribute</b>	User group relationship attribute (default: <code>memberuid</code> )

#### 4. In the **IDP Service Configuration Validation** section:

- Enter a valid LDAP account username and password
- The username must match the **Login Field** setting
- Click to verify the configuration

#### 5. (Optional) Configure **LDAP Auto-Sync Policy**:

- Enable **Auto-Sync Users** switch
- Set synchronization rules
- Use [online tool](#) <sup>↗</sup> to verify CRON expressions

## 6. Click **Add**

### NOTE

After adding LDAP:

- Users can log in before synchronization
- User information syncs automatically on first login
- Auto-sync occurs based on configured rules

# LDAP Configuration Examples

## LDAP Connector Configuration

The following example shows how to configure an LDAP connector:



```
apiVersion: dex.coreos.com/v1
kind: Connector
id: ldap          # Connector ID
name: ldap        # Connector display name
type: ldap        # Connector type is LDAP
metadata:
  name: ldap
  namespace: cpaas-system
spec:
  config:
    # LDAP server address and port
    host: ldap.example.com:636
    # DN and password for the service account used by the connector.
    # This DN is used to search for users and groups.
    bindDN: uid=serviceaccount,cn=users,dc=example,dc=com
    # Service account password, required when creating a connector.
    bindPW: password

    # Login account prompt. For example, username
    usernamePrompt: SSO Username

    # User search configuration
    userSearch:
      # Start searching from the base DN
      baseDN: cn=users,dc=example,dc=com
      # LDAP query statement, used to search for users.
      # For example: "(&(objectClass=person)(uid=<username>))"
      filter: (&(objectClass=organizationalPerson))

    # The following fields are direct mappings of user entry attribute
    # User ID attribute
    idAttr: uid
    # Required. Attribute to map to email
    emailAttr: mail
    # Required. Attribute to map to username
    nameAttr: cn
    # Login username attribute
    # Filter condition will be converted to "<attr>=<username>", such
    # as (uid=example).
    username: uid

    # Extended attributes
```

```
# phoneAttr: phone

# Group search configuration
groupSearch:
  # Start searching from the base DN
  baseDN: cn=groups,dc=freeipa,dc=example,dc=com
  # Group filter condition
  # "(&(objectClass=group)(member=<user uid>))".
  filter: "(objectClass=group)"
  # User group matching field
  # Group attribute
  groupAttr: member
  # User group member attribute
  userAttr: uid
  # 组显示名称
  nameAttr: cn
```

## User Filter Examples

```
# 1. Basic filter: Find all users
(&(objectClass=person))

# 2. Multiple conditions combination: Find users in a specific department
(&(objectClass=person)(departmentNumber=1000))

# 3. Find enabled users (Active Directory)
(&(objectClass=user)(!(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2)))

# 4. Find users with a specific email domain
(&(objectClass=person)(mail=*@example.com))

# 5. Find members of specific group
(&(objectClass=person)(memberOf=cn=developers,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com))

# 6. Find recently logged in users (Active Directory)
(&(objectClass=user)(lastLogon>=20240101000000.0Z))

# 7. Exclude system accounts
(&(objectClass=person)(!(uid=admin))(!(uid=system)))

# 8. Find users with a specific attribute
(&(objectClass=person)(mobile=*))

# 9. Find users in multiple departments
(&(objectClass=person)(|(ou=IT)(ou=HR)(ou=Finance)))

# 10. Complex condition combination example
(&
  (objectClass=person)
  |(department=IT)(department=Engineering))
  !(title=Intern)
  (manager=cn=John Doe,ou=People,dc=example,dc=com)
)
```

## Group Search Configuration Examples

```
# 1. Basic filter: Find all groups
(objectClass=groupOfNames)

# 2. Find groups with a specific prefix
(&(objectClass=groupOfNames)(cn=dev-*))

# 3. Find non-empty groups
(&(objectClass=groupOfNames)(member=*))

# 4. Find groups with a specific member
(&(objectClass=groupOfNames)(member=uid=john,ou=People,dc=example,dc=com))

# 5. Find nested groups (Active Directory)
(&(objectClass=group)(|(groupType=-2147483646)(groupType=-2147483644)))

# 6. Find groups with a specific description
(&(objectClass=groupOfNames)(description=*admin*))

# 7. Exclude system groups
(&(objectClass=groupOfNames)(!(cn=system*)))

# 8. Find groups with specific members
(&(objectClass=groupOfNames)(|(cn=admins)(cn=developers)(cn=operators)))

# 9. Find groups in a specific OU
(&(objectClass=groupOfNames)(ou=IT))

# 10. Complex condition combination example
(&
  (objectClass=groupOfNames)
  (|(cn=prod-*)(cn=dev-*))
  (!(cn=deprecated-*))
  (owner=cn=admin,dc=example,dc=com)
)
```

## Examples of AND(&) and OR(|) Operators in LDAP Filters



```
# AND operator (&) - All conditions must be met
# Syntax: (&(condition1)(condition2)(condition3)...)

# Multiple attribute AND example
(&
  (objectClass=person)
  (mail=*@example.com)
  (title=Engineer)
  (manager=*)
)

# OR operator (|) - At least one condition must be met
# Syntax: (|(condition1)(condition2)(condition3)...)

# Multiple attribute OR example
(|
  (department=IT)
  (department=HR)
  (department=Finance)
)

# Combining AND and OR
(&
  (objectClass=person)
  (|
    (department=IT)
    (department=R&D)
  )
  (employeeType=FullTime)
)

# Complex condition combination
(&
  (objectClass=person)
  (|
    (&
      (department=IT)
      (title=*Engineer*)
    )
    (&
      (department=R&D)
      (title=*Developer*)
    )
  )
)
```

```
)  
(!(status=Inactive))  
(|(manager=*)(isManager=TRUE))  
)
```

## Synchronize LDAP Users

After successfully synchronizing LDAP users to the platform, you can view the synchronized users in the user list.

You can configure an automatic synchronization policy when [adding LDAP](#) (which can be updated later) or manually trigger synchronization after adding LDAP successfully. Here's how to manually trigger a synchronization operation.

### Notes:

- Newly added users in the LDAP integrated with the platform can log in to the platform before performing the user synchronization operation. Once they successfully log in to the platform, their information will be automatically synchronized to the platform.
- Users deleted from LDAP will have an `Invalid` status after synchronization.
- The default validity period for newly synchronized users is **Permanent**.
- Synchronized users with the same name as existing users (local users, IDP users) are automatically associated. Their permissions and validity period will be consistent with existing users. They can log in to the platform using the login method corresponding to their respective sources.


## Procedure of Operation

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > IDPs**.
2. Click the **LDAP name** that you want to manually synchronize.
3. Click **Actions > Sync user** in the upper-right corner.
4. Click **Sync**.

**Notes:** If you manually close the synchronization prompt dialog, a confirmation dialog will appear to confirm the closure. After closing the synchronization prompt dialog, the system will continue to synchronize users. If you remain on the user list page, you will receive

synchronization result feedback. If you leave the user list page, you will not receive synchronization results.

## Relevant Operations

You can click the  on the right in the list page or click **Actions** in the upper-right corner on the details page to update or delete LDAP as needed.

Operation	Description
<b>Update LDAP</b>	<p>Update the configuration information of the added LDAP or the <b>LDAP Auto-Sync Policy</b>.</p> <p><b>Note:</b> After updating LDAP, users currently synchronized to the platform through this LDAP will also be updated. Users removed from LDAP will become invalid in the platform user list. You can clean up junk data by executing the operation to clean up invalid users.</p>
<b>Delete LDAP</b>	<p>After deleting LDAP, all users synchronized to the platform through this LDAP will have an <b>Invalid</b> status (the binding relationship between users and roles remains unchanged), and they cannot log in to the platform. After re-integrating, synchronization needs to be re-executed to activate users.</p> <p><b>Tips:</b> After deleting IDP, if you need to delete users and user groups synchronized to the platform through LDAP, check the checkbox <b>Clean IDP Users and User Groups</b> below the prompt box.</p>

# OIDC Management

The platform supports the OIDC (OpenID Connect) protocol, enabling platform administrators to log in using third-party accounts after adding OIDC configuration. Platform administrators can also update and delete configured OIDC services.

## TOC

[Overview of OIDC](#)[Adding OIDC](#)[Procedure of Operation](#)[Adding OIDC via YAML](#)[Example: Configuring OIDC Connector](#)[Relevant Operations](#)

## Overview of OIDC

OIDC (OpenID Connect) is an identity authentication standard protocol based on the OAuth 2.0 protocol. It uses an OAuth 2.0 authorization server to provide user identity authentication for third-party clients and passes the corresponding identity authentication information to the client.

OIDC allows all types of clients (including server-side, mobile, and JavaScript clients) to request and receive authenticated sessions and end-user information. This specification suite

is extensible, allowing participants to use optional features such as identity data encryption, OpenID Provider discovery, and session management when meaningful. For more information, refer to the [OIDC official documentation](#) ↗.

## Adding OIDC

By adding OIDC, you can use third-party platform accounts to log in to the platform.

**Note:** After OIDC users successfully log in to the platform, the platform will use the user's email attribute as the unique identifier. OIDC-supported third-party platform users must have an **email** attribute; otherwise, they will not be able to log in to the platform.

## Procedure of Operation

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Users > IDPs**.
2. Click **Add OIDC**.
3. Configure the **Basic Information** parameters.
4. Configure the **OIDC Server Configuration** parameters:
  - **Identity Provider URL:** The issuer URL, which is the access address of the OIDC identity provider.
  - **Client ID:** The client identifier for the OIDC client.
  - **Client Secret:** The secret key for the OIDC client.
  - **Redirect URI:** The callback address after logging in to the third-party platform, which is the URL of the dex issuer + `/callback`.
  - **Logout URL:** The address visited by the user after performing the **Logout** operation. If empty, the logout address will be the platform's initial login page.
5. In the **IDP Service Configuration Validation** area, enter the **Username** and **Password** of a valid OIDC account to verify the configuration.

**Tip:** If the username and password are incorrect, an error will be reported during addition, indicating invalid credentials, and OIDC cannot be added.
6. Click **Create**.

# Adding OIDC via YAML

In addition to form configuration, the platform also supports adding OIDC through YAML, which allows for more flexible configuration of authentication parameters, claim mappings, user group synchronization, and other advanced features.

## Example: Configuring OIDC Connector

The following example demonstrates how to configure an OIDC connector for integrating with OIDC identity authentication services. This configuration example is suitable for the following scenarios:

1. Need to integrate OIDC as an identity authentication server.
2. Need to support user group information synchronization.
3. Need to customize logout redirect address.
4. Need to configure specific OIDC scopes.
5. Need to customize claim mappings.





```

ed for OIDC basic authentication
  - profile # Optional, used
ed to obtain user basic information
  - email # Optional, used
ed to obtain user email

# Claim mapping configuration
# Configure the mapping relationship between OIDC returned claims and
platform user attributes
claimMapping:
  email: email # Email mapping, used for user unique identification
  groups: groups # User group mapping, used for organization structure
  phone: "" # Phone mapping, optional
  preferred_username: preferred_username # Username mapping, used for display name

# Custom claimextra configuration
# External custom fields will be dynamically added to the user object
spec.extra field
claimExtra:
  - field: xxx # Custom field name
    type: string # Field type value is consistent with the definition of go language type. For example: string, int, bool, map[string]string, []string, []int

# User group configuration
# Configure user group synchronization related parameters, ensure that the token contains group information
groupsKey: groups # Specify the key name of group information
insecureEnableGroups: false # Whether to enable group synchronization function

```

## Relevant Operations

You can click the [OIDC](#) link on the right in the list page or click **Actions** in the upper-right corner on the details page to update or delete OIDC as needed.

Operation	Description
<b>Update OIDC</b>	Update the added OIDC configuration. After updating the OIDC configuration information, the original users and authentication methods will be reset and synchronized according to the current configuration.
<b>Delete OIDC</b>	<p>Delete OIDC that is no longer used by the platform. After deleting OIDC, all users synchronized to the platform through this OIDC will have an <b>Invalid</b> status (the binding relationship between users and roles remains unchanged), and they cannot log in to the platform. After re-integrating, users can be activated by successfully logging in to the platform.</p> <p><b>Tip:</b> After deleting IDP, if you need to delete users and user groups synchronized to the platform through OIDC, check the checkbox <b>Clean IDP Users and User Groups</b> below the prompt box.</p>

# Troubleshooting

## Delete User

Problem Description

Solution

# Delete User

---

## TOC

[Problem Description](#)[Solution](#)

- Clean up deleted IDP users

- Clean up deleted local users

---

## Problem Description

**Issue:** When creating or synchronizing a new user, the system indicates that the user already exists. How should you handle this?

For security reasons, the platform prevents creating new users (both local and IDP users) with names that match previously deleted users. This limitation applies to:

- Creating new local users with names matching deleted users
- Synchronizing IDP users with names matching deleted users

After upgrading to the current version, you may encounter this issue when:

- Creating new users with names that match users deleted before the upgrade
  - Synchronizing new users with names that match users deleted before the upgrade
-

# Solution

To resolve this issue, you need to clean up the deleted user information by executing specific scripts on your global cluster control nodes.

## Clean up deleted IDP users

Execute the following command on any control node of your global cluster:

```
kubectl delete users -l 'auth.cpaas.io/user.connector_id=<IDP Name>,auth.cpaas.io/user.state=deleted'
```

Example:

```
kubectl delete users -l 'auth.cpaas.io/user.connector_id=github,auth.cpaas.io/user.state=deleted'
```

## Clean up deleted local users

Execute these two scripts in sequence on any control node of your global cluster:

1. Clean up user passwords:

```
kubectl get users -l 'auth.cpaas.io/user.connector_id=local,auth.cpaas.io/user.state=deleted' | awk '{print $1}' | xargs kubectl delete password -n cpaas-system
```

2. Clean up users:

```
kubectl delete users -l 'auth.cpaas.io/user.connector_id=local,auth.cpaas.io/user.state=deleted'
```

# User Policy

---

## Introduction

Overview

Configure Security Policy

Available Policies

# Introduction

The platform provides comprehensive user security policies to enhance login security and protect against malicious attacks.

---

## TOC

### Overview

Configure Security Policy

Steps

Available Policies

---

## Overview

The platform supports the following security policies:

- Password security management
  - User account disablement
  - User account locking
  - User notifications
  - Access control
-

# Configure Security Policy

## Steps

1. In the left navigation bar, click **User Role Management > User Security Policy**
2. Click **Update** in the top right corner
3. Configure the security policies as needed
4. Click **Update** to save changes

### WARNING

Policy Configuration Notes:

- Check the box before a policy to enable it
- Uncheck the box to disable a policy
- Disabled policies retain their configuration data
- Previous settings are restored when re-enabling a policy

## Available Policies

Policy	Description
<b>User Authentication Policy</b>	<p>Enables dual authentication for password-based login:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Users receive verification codes via specified notification methods</li> <li>- Supports various notification servers (e.g., Enterprise Communication Tool Server)</li> </ul>
<b>Password Security Policy</b>	<p>Manages password requirements:</p> <p>First Login:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Forces password change on first platform login</li> </ul> <p>Regular Updates:</p>

Policy	Description
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Requires password change after specified period (e.g., 90 days)</li> <li>- Prevents login until password is updated</li> </ul>
<b>User Disablement Policy</b>	Automatically disables inactive accounts: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Triggers after specified period of no login</li> </ul>
<b>User Locking Policy</b>	Protects against brute force attacks:  Lock Conditions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Triggers after specified number of failed login attempts within 24 hours</li> </ul> Lock Duration: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Account remains locked for specified minutes</li> <li>- Automatically unlocks after lock period expires</li> </ul>
<b>Notification Policy</b>	Manages user notifications: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sends initial password via email after user creation</li> </ul>
<b>Access Control</b>	Manages user sessions and access:  Session Management: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Auto-logs out inactive sessions after specified time</li> <li>- Limits maximum concurrent online users</li> </ul> Browser Control: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ends session when all product tabs are closed</li> <li>- Prevents multiple logins from same client</li> </ul> :::note  Important Notes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Access Control only affects new logins after policy update</li> <li>- Browser tab restoration may not trigger session end</li> <li>- Only last login is allowed per client when preventing repeated login</li> </ul> :::

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[Alauda Container Platform](#) > [Security](#) > [Multitenancy\(Project\)](#)

---

# Multitenancy(Project)

---

## Introduction

### Introduction

Project

Namespaces

Relationship Between Clusters, Projects, and Namespaces

---

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# Introduction

---

## TOC

### Project

Namespaces

Relationship Between Clusters, Projects, and Namespaces

---

## Project

A project is a resource isolation unit that enables multi-tenant usage scenarios in enterprises. It divides resources from one or more clusters into isolated environments, ensuring both resource and personnel isolation. Projects can represent different subsidiaries, departments, or project teams within an enterprise. Through project management, you can achieve:

- Resource isolation between project teams
- Quota management within tenants
- Efficient resource allocation and control

## Namespaces

Namespaces are smaller, mutually isolated resource spaces within a project. They serve as workspaces for users to implement their production workloads. Key characteristics of

---

namespaces include:

- Multiple namespaces can be created under a project
- Total resource quota of all namespaces cannot exceed the project quota
- Resource quotas are allocated more granularly at the namespace level
- Container sizes (CPU, memory) are limited at the namespace level
- Improved resource utilization through fine-grained control

## Relationship Between Clusters, Projects, and Namespaces

The platform's resource hierarchy follows these rules:

- A project can utilize resources (CPU, memory, storage) from multiple clusters, and a cluster can allocate resources to multiple projects.
- Multiple namespaces can be created under a project, with their combined resource quotas not exceeding the total project resources.
- A namespace's resource quota must come from a single cluster, and a namespace can only belong to one project.

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## Create Project

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# Create Project

Before your project team starts working, you can create a project based on the existing cluster resources on the platform. The project will be isolated from other projects (tenants) in terms of both resources and personnel. When creating a project, you can allocate resources according to your project scale and actual business needs. The project can utilize resources from multiple clusters on the platform.

## WARNING

When creating a project, the platform will automatically create a namespace with the same name as the project in the associated clusters to isolate platform-level resources. Please do not modify this namespace or its resources.

## TOC

[Procedure](#)

## Procedure

1. In the **Project Management** view, click **Create Project**.
2. On the **Basic information** page, configure the following parameters:

Parameter	Description
<b>Name</b>	<p>The name of the project, which cannot be the same as an existing project name or any name in the project name blacklist. Otherwise, the project cannot be created.</p> <p><b>Note:</b> The project name blacklist includes special namespace names under platform clusters: <code>cpaas-system</code>, <code>cert-manager</code>, <code>default</code>, <code>global-credentials</code>, <code>kube-ovn</code>, <code>kube-public</code>, <code>kube-system</code>, <code>nsx-system</code>, <code>alauda-system</code>, <code>kube-federation-system</code>, <code>ALL-ALL</code>, and <code>true</code>.</p>
<b>Cluster</b>	<p>The cluster(s) associated with the project, where the administrator can allocate resource quotas. Click the drop-down selection box to select one or more clusters.</p> <p><b>Note:</b> Clusters in abnormal state cannot be selected.</p>

3. Click **Next** and in the project quota setting step, read [Manage Resource Quotas](#) to set the resource quotas to be allocated to the current project for the selected clusters.
4. Click **Create Project**.

# Manage Project Quotas

This guide explains how ACP extends Kubernetes ResourceQuota with a project-level aggregate quota (ProjectQuota). ProjectQuota lets you cap the sum of ResourceQuotas across all namespaces in a project, so you can plan and govern capacity at the project level while still delegating limits to individual namespaces.

## TOC

### [What is ProjectQuota?](#)

How it works

When to use ProjectQuota

Quota keys and units

Allocation strategy tips

Best practices and FAQs

## What is ProjectQuota?

- ResourceQuota (Kubernetes native) limits resources per namespace (CPU, memory, object counts, etc.). For concepts, keys, and usage, please refer to:
  - [Resource Quotas](#)

- ProjectQuota defines a project-wide upper bound: the total of all namespace ResourceQuotas within the project must not exceed the project's hard limits for the same keys.

In short: ResourceQuota caps a single namespace; ProjectQuota caps the sum across all namespaces in a project.

## How it works

- Workflow order: define or adjust the ProjectQuota first, then allocate per-namespace ResourceQuotas within that project budget.
- Scope: ProjectQuota applies to a platform project and governs all namespaces that belong to it.
- Aggregate enforcement at admission time:
  - When creating or updating a namespace's ResourceQuota, the platform computes the aggregate for the same keys (for example, `limits.cpu`, `requests.memory`,  `pods` ) across all namespaces in the project, including the incoming change.
  - The request is allowed only if the new aggregate remains less than or equal to the corresponding ProjectQuota hard limits. Otherwise, the change is rejected with an explanatory error.
- Execution model:
  - ProjectQuota constrains what can be allocated via namespace ResourceQuotas (pre-allocation), not the instantaneous runtime usage. Actual consumption remains governed by each namespace's ResourceQuota and the scheduler.

## When to use ProjectQuota

- Budget/capacity governance per project: allocate a fixed CPU/memory/object budget, then subdivide across namespaces.
- Multi-team or multi-environment projects (for example,  `dev / staging / prod` ) that share a common upper bound.

- Preventing quota drift: keep a single "big bucket" at the project layer so namespace quotas do not silently inflate over time.

## Quota keys and units

ProjectQuota supports the same common keys as ResourceQuota (non-exhaustive):

- Compute and memory: `limits.cpu`, `limits.memory`, `requests.cpu`, `requests.memory`
- Workload/object counts: `Pods`, `services`, `configmaps`, `secrets`, `pvc`, and more

Units and counting rules:

- CPU uses cores (for example, `2`, `500m`)
- Memory uses bytes (for example, `8Gi`)
- Object-style keys use integer counts

If the sum of the corresponding keys across all namespaces approaches or exceeds the ProjectQuota hard limit, ACP blocks further ResourceQuota creation or expansion for that key.

## Allocation strategy tips

- Define the project "big bucket" first (ProjectQuota), then split it into per-namespace ResourceQuotas for teams/environments.
- Keep 10% - 30% headroom for spikes and elastic scaling.
- Review regularly: reclaim underused quota and reassign; raise consistently constrained namespaces, and adjust the project cap accordingly.

## Best practices and FAQs

- Q: Increasing a namespace's `limits.memory` fails with an error about exceeding project quota. Why?

- A: The project's ProjectQuota hard limit for that key would be exceeded by the requested change. Reduce other namespaces' quotas, or raise the project cap first and then retry the namespace change.
- Q: I raised the ProjectQuota, but workloads still won't schedule.
  - A: Ensure each namespace's ResourceQuota is also increased appropriately and verify underlying cluster/node capacity.
- Recommendation: Manage ProjectQuota as part of your normal change control, aligned with capacity planning (nodes/storage) and budget management.

# Manage Project

This guide explains how to update basic information and project quotas for a specified project, or delete the project.

---

## TOC

### [Update Basic Project Information](#)

Procedure

### [Delete Project](#)

Procedure

---

## Update Basic Project Information

Update basic information for a specified project, such as display name and description.

### Procedure

1. In the **Project Management** view, click on the project name to be updated.
  2. In the left navigation pane, click **Details**.
  3. Click **Actions** > **Update Basics** in the upper right corner.
  4. Modify or enter the **Display name** and **Description**.
-

5. Click **Update**.

## Delete Project

Delete projects that are no longer in use.

### WARNING

After the project is deleted, the resources occupied by the project in the cluster will be released.

## Procedure

1. In the **Project Management** view, click on the project name to be deleted.
2. In the left navigation bar, click **Details**.
3. Click **Actions** > **Delete Project** in the upper right corner.
4. Enter the name of the project and click **Delete**.

# Manage Project Cluster

This guide explains how to manage cluster associations for a project. You can add clusters to allocate their resources to the project, or remove clusters to reclaim the allocated resources.

## TOC

### [Introduction](#)

#### [Add a Cluster](#)

##### [Procedure](#)

#### [Remove a Cluster](#)

##### [Procedure](#)

## Introduction

You can add clusters to a project to allocate their resources, or remove clusters to reclaim the allocated resources. This functionality is useful in the following scenarios:

- When project resources are insufficient for business operations
- When a newly created or added cluster needs to be allocated to an existing project
- When cluster resources need to be reclaimed from a project
- When a specific project needs exclusive access to a cluster

# Add a Cluster

Add a cluster to a project and set its resource quota.

## Procedure

1. In the **Project Management** view, click on the project name where you want to add the cluster.
2. In the left navigation bar, click **Details**.
3. Click **Actions** > **Add Cluster** in the upper right corner.
4. Select the cluster and set the resource quota to be allocated to the current project. The following resources can be configured:
  - CPU (cores)
  - Memory (Gi)
  - Storage (Gi)
  - PVC count (number)
  - Pods (number)
  - vGPU (virtual GPU)/MPS/pGPU (physical GPU, cores)
  - Video memory quota

### NOTE

- GPU resource quota can only be configured when GPU plugins are deployed in the cluster.

When GPU resources are **GPU-Manager** or **MPS GPU**, **vMemory** quota can also be configured.

**GPU Units:** 100 units of virtual cores are equivalent to 1 physical core (1 pGPU = 1 core = 100 GPU-Manager core = 100 MPS core), and pGPU units can only be allocated in whole numbers. GPU-Manager 1 unit of memory is equal to 256 Mi, MPS GPU 1 unit of memory is equal to 1 Gi, and 1024 Mi = 1 Gi.

- If no quota is set for a certain type of resource, it defaults to **Unlimited**. This means that the project can use the available resources of the corresponding type in the cluster as needed, without a maximum limit.
- The value of the project quota set should be within the quota range displayed on the page. Under each resource quota input box, the allocated quota and total amount of that resource will be displayed for reference.

5. Click **Add**.

## Remove a Cluster

Remove a cluster associated with a project.

### WARNING

- After removing a cluster, the project cannot use the business resources under the removed cluster.
- When the cluster to be removed is abnormal, the resources under the abnormal cluster cannot be cleaned up. It is recommended to fix the cluster before removing it.

## Procedure

1. In the **Project Management** view, click on the project name where you want to remove the cluster.
2. In the left navigation bar, click **Details**.
3. Click **Actions** > **Remove Cluster** in the upper right corner.
4. In the pop-up **Remove Cluster** dialog box, enter the name of the cluster to be removed, and then click the **Remove** button to successfully remove the cluster.

# Manage Project Members

This guide explains how to manage project members, including importing members and assigning project-related roles.

## TOC

### Import Members

- Constraints and Limitations

- Procedure

  - Import from Member List

  - Import OIDC Users


- Remove Members

- Procedure

## Import Members

You can grant users operation permissions for the project and its namespaces by importing existing platform users or adding OIDC users. Assign platform-provided roles such as project administrators, namespace administrators, or developers. If you need tailor-made permissions, create a native Kubernetes Role/ClusterRole under **Users > Platform Roles > Kubernetes Roles** and bind it to the desired users through RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding.

## Constraints and Limitations

- When no OIDC IDP is configured on the platform:
  - Only existing platform users can be imported as project members, including:
    - OIDC users who have successfully logged in
    - Users synchronized through LDAP
    - Local users
    - Users added to other projects as OIDC users (with source marked as )
- When an OIDC IDP is configured:
  - You can add valid OIDC accounts that meet the input requirements
  - Account validity cannot be verified during addition
  - Ensure the account is valid, or it won't be able to log in normally
- System default administrator users and the currently logged-in user cannot be imported

## Procedure

1. In the **Project Management** view, click on the project name to be managed.
2. In the left navigation bar, click **Members**.
3. Click **Import Member**.
4. Choose either **Member List** or **OIDC Users**.

## Import from Member List

You can import either all users or selected users from the member list.

### TIP

Use the user group dropdown menu in the upper right corner and the search box to filter users by username.

**To import all users:**

1. Select **Member List**.
2. Click the **Bind** dropdown menu and select the role to assign to all users.  
If the role requires a namespace, select it from the **Namespaces** dropdown menu.
3. Click **Import All**.

#### To import specific users:

1. Select **Member List**.
2. Select one or more users using the checkboxes.
3. Click the **Bind** dropdown menu and select the role to assign to the selected users.  
If the role requires a namespace, select it from the **Namespaces** dropdown menu.
4. Click **Import**.

## Import OIDC Users

1. Select **OIDC Users**.
2. Click **Add** to create a member record (repeat for multiple members).
3. Enter the OIDC-authenticated username in the **Name** field.

### WARNING

Ensure the username corresponds to an account that can be authenticated by the configured OIDC system, or login will fail.

4. Select the role from the **Roles** dropdown menu.  
If the role requires a namespace, select it from the **Namespaces** dropdown menu.
5. Click **Import**.

After successful import, you can view:

- The member in the project member list
- The user in **Platform Management > Users**
  - Source shows as "-" until first login/sync
  - Source updates after successful login/sync

# Remove Members

Remove a project member to revoke their permissions.

## Procedure

1. In the **Project Management** view, click on the project name.
2. In the left navigation bar, click **Members**.

### TIP

Use the dropdown list next to the search box to filter members by **Name**, **Display name**, or **User Group**.

3. Click **Remove** next to the member you want to remove.
4. Confirm removal in the prompt dialog.

# Audit

## Introduction

[Prerequisites](#)

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[Search Results](#)

# Introduction

The platform's auditing function provides time-ordered operation records related to users and system security. This helps you analyze specific issues and quickly resolve problems that occur in clusters, custom applications, and other areas.

Through auditing, you can track various changes in the Kubernetes cluster, including:

- What changes occurred in the cluster during a specific time period
- Who performed these changes (system components or users)
- Details of important change events (e.g., POD parameter updates)
- Event outcomes (success or failure)
- Operator location (internal or external to the cluster)
- User operation records (updates, deletions, management operations) and their results

---

## TOC

[Prerequisites](#)

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---

## Prerequisites

- Your account must have platform management or platform auditing permissions.
- This feature relies on the logging service. Please ensure that the ACP Log Essentials , ACP Log Collector and ACP Log Storage plugins are installed within the platform beforehand.

### Note

Because Logging Service releases on a different cadence from Alauda Container Platform, the Logging Service documentation is now available as a separate documentation set at [Logging Service ↗](#).

## Procedure

1. In the left navigation bar, click **Auditing**.
2. Select the auditing scope from the tabs:
  - **User Operations**: View operation records of users who have logged in to the platform
  - **System Operations**: View system operation records (operators start with `system:` )
3. Configure query conditions to filter auditing events:

Query Condition	Description
<b>Operator</b>	Username or system account name of the operator (default: <code>ALL</code> )
<b>Actions</b>	Type of operation (create, update, delete, manage, rollback, stop, etc., default: <code>ALL</code> )
<b>Clusters</b>	Cluster containing the operated resource (default: <code>ALL</code> )
<b>Resource Type</b>	Type of the operated resource (default: <code>ALL</code> )
<b>Resource Name</b>	Name of the operated resource (supports fuzzy search)

4. Click **Search**.

**TIP**

- Use the **Time Range** dropdown to set the audit time range (default: `Last 30 Minutes`). You can select a preset range or customize one.
- Click the refresh icon to update search results.
- Click the export icon to download results as a `.csv` file.

## Search Results

The search results display the following information:

Parameter	Description
<b>Operator</b>	Username or system account name of the operator
<b>Actions</b>	Type of operation (create, update, delete, manage, rollback, stop, etc.)
<b>Resource Name/Type</b>	Name and type of the operated resource
<b>Clusters</b>	Cluster containing the operated resource
<b>Namespaces</b>	Namespace containing the operated resource
<b>Client IP</b>	IP address of the client used to execute the operation
<b>Operation Result</b>	Operation outcome based on API return code (2xx = success, other = failure)
<b>Operation Time</b>	Timestamp of the operation
<b>Details</b>	Click the <b>Details</b> button to view the complete audit record in JSON format in the <b>Audit Details</b> dialog box

# Telemetry

---

## Install

Prerequisites

Installation Steps

Enable Online Operations

Uninstallation Steps

# Install

ACP Telemetry is a platform service that collects telemetry data from clusters for online operations and maintenance. It collects system metrics and uploads them to Alauda Cloud for monitoring and analysis.

## TOC

[Prerequisites](#)[Installation Steps](#)[Enable Online Operations](#)[Uninstallation Steps](#)

## Prerequisites

Before installation, ensure that:

- The Alauda Container Platform has a valid license
- The global cluster has internet access

## Installation Steps

1. Navigate to **Administrator**

2. In the left navigation bar, click **Marketplace > Cluster Plugins**
3. Select the **global** cluster in the top navigation bar
4. Search for **ACP Telemetry** and click to view its details
5. Click **Install** to deploy the plugin

## Enable Online Operations

1. In the left navigation bar, click **System Settings > Platform Maintenance**
2. Click the **On** button for **Online Operations**

## Uninstallation Steps

1. Follow steps 1-4 from the installation process to locate the plugin
  2. Click **Uninstall** to remove the plugin
-

# Certificates

[Automated Kubernetes Certific](#)

[cert-manager](#)

[OLM Certifi](#)

[Certificate Monitoring](#)

[Rotate TLS](#)

# Automated Kubernetes Certificate Rotation

This guide helps you install, understand, and operate the Kubernetes Certificate Rotator in ACP to automate the rotation of Kubernetes certificates within your clusters.

## TOC

### [Installation](#)

How it works

Rotation Process

Operation Considerations

## Installation

See [Cluster Plugin](#) for installation instructions.

### Note:

- Currently supported:
  - On-Premises clusters
  - DCS clusters

# How it works

This plugin handles automatic rotation for the following certificates.

Certificate file	Function	Node Type
apiserver.crt	Server certificate for kube-apiserver	Control Plane Node
apiserver-etcd-client.crt	Client certificate for kube-apiserver to access etcd	Control Plane Node
apiserver-kubelet-client.crt	Client certificate for kube-apiserver to access kubelet	Control Plane Node
front-proxy-client.crt	Client certificate for kube-apiserver to access aggregated API servers	Control Plane Node
etcd/server.crt	Server certificate for etcd	Control Plane Node
etcd/peer.crt	Peer communication certificate between etcd members	Control Plane Node
/root/.kube/config, admin.conf, super-admin.conf	Client certificate in kubeconfig for cluster administration	Control Plane Node
controller-manager.conf	Client certificate in kubeconfig for kube-controller-manager	Control Plane Node
scheduler.conf	Client certificate in kubeconfig for kube-scheduler	Control Plane Node
kubelet.crt	Server certificate for kubelet	All Nodes
kubelet-client-current.pem	Client certificate for kubelet (referenced by kubelet.conf)	All Nodes

## Rotation Process

## 1. Load certificate information

The initial step involves gathering metadata for all target certificates. Since these certificates are stored in different paths on the host, their contents must be read from the respective files. To achieve this, a temporary Pod is created on the target node with the certificate directories mounted, allowing the Pod to read the information. The certificate's information is collected once per day. Certificate details (paths, expiration) are maintained in the ConfigMap `cpaas-system/node-local-certs-<node-name>`. The encrypted CA certificate is stored in Secret `cpaas-system/kubernetes-ca`.

## 2. Rotation Trigger Condition

The `notBefore` and `notAfter` fields of the certificate indicate the validity period. Rotation is triggered if the remaining validity period is less than 20% or 30 days.

## 3. Rotation queue

Certificates requiring rotation are placed in a queue for processing. The rotation program evaluates recent rotation activities and the urgency of pending tasks to decide whether to process them immediately. This prevents potential cluster health issues caused by the simultaneous rotation of multiple certificates.

## 4. Generate new certificates

The rotation program generates new certificates based on internally stored CA information. The rotation process creates a temporary Pod on the target node with the necessary certificate directories mounted, allowing for controlled file modifications.

## 5. Restart the components

### Requiring restart:

- `kube-apiserver`: It needs to be restarted to load the new certificates. During restart, it regenerates its internal loopback certificate (valid for one year, used only internally and can not be externally rotated).
- `kube-controller-manager`: It needs to be restarted to reload the kubeconfig file.
- `kube-scheduler`: It needs to be restarted to reload the kubeconfig file.
- `kubelet`: It needs to be restarted to reload the server certificate.

**Restart method:** Add annotations to the respective static Pods' YAML files to trigger the kubelet to recreate the Pods. To restart kubelet, mount the host filesystem with `hostPID is true` and run "systemctl restart kubelet" in the container.

### Auto-reloading:

- Etcd can auto-reload the certificates.

## 6. Rotation Timelines

- `kubelet` certificates: Rotate at 61 days (91-day validity)
- Control plane certificates: Rotate at 292 days (365-day validity)

## Operation Considerations

If `kubelet` is in an abnormal state during the rotation window and cannot rotate certificates automatically, manual rotation is required:

Operators must manually renew the certificates.

Run the following commands to renew the certificates manually:

```
cert-renew --ca-cert <ca-cert-path> --ca-key <ca-key-path> --days <days>  
<certificate or kubeconfig 1> <certificate or kubeconfig 2> ...
```

For example to renew the `kubelet.crt`:

```
cert-renew --ca-cert /etc/kubernetes/pki/ca.crt --ca-key /etc/kubernetes/  
pki/ca.key --days 91 /etc/kubernetes/pki/kubelet.crt
```

To download and prepare the `cert-renew` tool, run:

```
curl "$(kubectl get services -n cpaas-system frontend -o jsonpath='{.spe  
c.clusterIP}'):8080/cluster-cert-rotator/download/cert-renew" -o ./cert-r  
enew && chmod +x ./cert-renew
```

Optionally, download `renew-all.sh` to renew all certificates on the node:

```
curl "$(kubectl get services -n cpaas-system frontend -o jsonpath='{.spe  
c.clusterIP}'):8080/cluster-cert-rotator/download/renew-all.sh" -o ./rene  
w-all.sh
```

# cert-manager

Each cluster will automatically deploy **Certificate for cert-manager**

**cert-manager** is a native Kubernetes certificate management controller that automatically generates and manages TLS certificates based on `Certificate` resources. Many components in Kubernetes clusters use cert-manager to manage their TLS certificates, ensuring secure communication.

---

## TOC

### Overview

How it works

Identifying cert-manager Managed Certificates

Common Labels and Annotations

Related Resources

---

## Overview

Cert-manager manages the lifecycle of certificates through Kubernetes Custom Resource Definitions (CRDs):

- **Certificate**: Defines the certificates that need to be managed
  - **Issuer/ClusterIssuer**: Defines certificate issuers
-

- **CertificateRequest**: Internal resource for processing certificate requests

## How it works

When a `Certificate` resource is created, cert-manager automatically:

1. Generates private keys and certificate signing requests
2. Obtains signed certificates from the specified Issuer
3. Stores certificates and private keys in Kubernetes Secrets

Additionally, cert-manager monitors the validity period of certificates and renews them before they expire to ensure continuous service availability.

## Identifying cert-manager Managed Certificates

Certificates managed by cert-manager have corresponding `Secret` resources with type `kubernetes.io/tls` and specific labels and annotations.

## Common Labels and Annotations

`Secret` resources managed by cert-manager typically contain the following labels and annotations:

### Labels:

- `controller.cert-manager.io/fao: "true"`: Identifies that this Secret is managed by cert-manager and enables filtered Secret caching by the controller.

### Annotations:

- `cert-manager.io/certificate-name`: Certificate name
- `cert-manager.io/common-name`: Common name of the certificate
- `cert-manager.io/alt-names`: Alternative names of the certificate
- `cert-manager.io/ip-sans`: IP addresses of the certificate

- `cert-manager.io/issuer-kind` : Type of certificate issuer
- `cert-manager.io/issuer-name` : Name of certificate issuer
- `cert-manager.io/issuer-group` : API group of the issuer
- `cert-manager.io/uri-sans` : URI Subject Alternative Names

## Related Resources

- [cert-manager Official Documentation](#) ↗

# OLM Certificates

All certificates for **Operator Lifecycle Manager (OLM)** components — including `olm-operator`, `catalog-operator`, `packageserver`, and `marketplace-operator` — are automatically managed by the system.

When installing Operators that define **webhooks** or **API services** in their **ClusterServiceVersion (CSV)** object, OLM automatically generates and rotates the required certificates.

# Certificate Monitoring

**Cluster Enhancer** provides monitoring capabilities for certificates used in Kubernetes clusters. The monitoring scope includes:

1. **Kubernetes component certificates**, including control plane and kubelet server/client certificates (including kubeconfig client certificates)
2. **Certificates of components running in the cluster**, implemented by inspecting all Secrets with type `kubernetes.io/tls`
3. **Server certificates actually used by kube-apiserver** (including internal loopback certificates for self-access) by accessing the `kubernetes` Endpoints

Users can find and install **Cluster Enhancer** in the **Administrator** view by navigating to **Marketplace > Cluster Plugins** in the left navigation.

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## TOC

### [Certificate Status Monitoring](#)

Built-in Alert Rules

Kubernetes Certificate Alerts

Platform Components Certificate Alerts

---

## Certificate Status Monitoring

The expiration status of certificates can be viewed through the metric

`certificate_expires_status`.

The expiration time of certificates can be viewed through the metric `certificate_expires_time`.

The current certificate status and expiration time can be viewed in the **Certificate Status** sub-tab. To access this sub-tab, go to the **Administrator** view, navigate to **Clusters > Clusters**, select a specific cluster, then go to the **Monitoring** tab.

## Built-in Alert Rules

**Cluster Enhancer** provides built-in alert rules `cpaas-certificates-rule` with the following alerts:

### Kubernetes Certificate Alerts

Rule	Level
The expiration time of the kubernetes certificate is about to expire (less than 30 days) <= 30d and last 1 minutes	Medium
The expiration time of the kubernetes certificate is about to expire (less than 10 days) <= 10d and last 1 minutes	High
Kubernetes certificate has expired <= 0d and last 1 minutes	Critical

### Platform Components Certificate Alerts

Rule	Level
The expiration time of the platform components certificate is about to expire (less than 30 days) <= 30d and last 1 minutes	Medium
The expiration time of the platform components certificate is about to expire (less than 10 days) <= 10d and last 1 minutes	High
Platform components certificate has expired <= 0d and last 1 minutes	Critical



# Rotate TLS Certs of Platform Access Addresses

## INFO

For ACP version v4.0.x, apply the same procedure to both the primary cluster and the standby cluster (terms of the Disaster Recovery setup) as described here.

## TOC

[Prerequisites](#)

[Procedures](#)

## Prerequisites

- A pair of TLS certificates and its private key.

## Procedures

1. On any control-plane node in the global cluster, export backups of the TLS certificates used by ACP's platform access addresses:

```
kubectl get certificate -n cpaas-system dex-serving-cert --ignore-not-found=true -o yaml > /cpaas/dex-serving-cert.yaml  
kubectl get secret -n cpaas-system dex.tls -o yaml > /cpaas/dex.tls.yaml
```

## 2. Delete the current certificates:

```
kubectl delete certificate -n cpaas-system dex-serving-cert --ignore-not-found=true  
kubectl delete secret -n cpaas-system dex.tls
```

## 3. Introduce the new certificate:

```
kubectl create secret tls dex.tls --cert=/path/to/tls.crt --key=/path/to/tls.key -n cpaas-system
```